Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Tom Gregory v. Mark Shurteff : Plaintiff/
Appellant's Opening Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jerrold S. Jensen; Brent A. Burnett; Assistant Attorneys General; Counsel for Defendants/Appellees.
David R. Irvine; Janet I. Jenson; Jenson & Guelker; Alan L. Smith; Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Gregory v. Shurteff, No. 20110277 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2827

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Tom Gregory, et al,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 20110277-SC
vs.
Mark Shurtleff, et al,
Defendants/Appellees.

PLAINTIFFS'/APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

APPEAL FROM RULE 12(b)(6) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
ENTERED BY THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
THE HONORABLE L. A. DEVER PRESIDING

Counsel for defendants/appellees:

Counsel for plaintiffs/appellants:

Jerrold S. Jensen
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

David R. Irvine
747 East South Temple Street
Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Janet I. Jenson
Jenson & Guelker, P.C.
747 East South Temple Street
Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Alan L. Smith
1169 East 4020 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 9 2011
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Tom Gregory, et ah,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
Sup. Ct. Dkt. No. 20110277-SC
vs.
Mark Shurtleff, et al,
Defendants/Appellees.

PLAINTIFFS'/APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF

APPEAL FROM RULE 12(b)(6) JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
ENTERED BY THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
THE HONORABLE L. A. DEVER PRESIDING

Counsel for defendants/appellees:

Counsel for plaintiffs/appellants:

Jerrold S. Jensen
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

David R. Irvine
747 East South Temple Street
Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Janet I. Jenson
Jenson & Guelker, P.C.
747 East South Temple Street
Suite 130
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Alan L. Smith
1169 East 4020 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

I. LIST OF PARTIES
The plaintiffs/appellants are: Tom Gregory, Glen E. Brown, A. Lamont Tyler,
Marjorie Tuckett, Teresa Theurer, Jordan Tanner, Debbie Swenson, Carmen
Snow, Marilyn Shields, Pat Rusk, Ronda Rose, Jack Redd, Georgia Peterson,
Carole Peterson, Bonnie Palmer, Denis Morrill, Bill Moore, Sarah Meier, Rosalind
McGee, Scott McCoy, Sheryl Allen, Dee Burningham, Kim Burningham, Carolyn
White, Michael Jensen, Steven O. Laing, Judy Larson, Lisa Watts Baskin, David
Hogue, Rebecca Chavez-Houck, Janice Fisher, Christine Johnson, Beth Beck,
Mike Marsh, Karen Hale, Becky Edwards, Janet Cannon, and Steven C. Baugh.
The defendants/appellees are: Mark Shurtleff, in his official capacity as
Attorney General for the state of Utah, Edward Alter, in his official capacity as
Treasurer for the state of Utah, and Jeff Herring, in his official capacity as
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Subject

Page

I. LIST OF PARTIES

2

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

3

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

5

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

9

V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES

9

VI. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION

10

VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

10

VIII. SUMMARY OF SINGLE SUBJECT ARGUMENT

14

A. THE PURPOSES SERVED
BY ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22,
IN UTAH'S CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

18

B. SB 2 VIOLATES THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE BY
BUNDLING SUBSTANTIVE LAW WITH BUDGETARY
AMENDMENTS AND APPROPRIATIONS MEASURES

24

C. SB 2 IS THE PRODUCT OF LOG-ROLLING AND,
THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE

30

D. SB 2 VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, BECAUSE,
AS AN OMNIBUS BILL, IT EMBRACES MORE THAN A
SINGLE SUBJECT

32

IX. SUMMARY OF CLEAR TITLE ARGUMENT

38

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3

i

A. SB 2'S TITLE, "MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM
BUDGET AMENDMENTS," IS UNDER-INCLUSIVE
IN RELATION TO THE CONTENTS OF THE BILL,
AND, THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE CLEAR TITLE
REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22

40

B. SB 2'S TITLE, "MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM
BUDGET AMENDMENTS," IS MISLEADING AND
CALCULATED TO SURPRISE, AND, THEREFORE,
RUNS AFOUL OF THE CLEAR TITLE REQUIREMENT
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22

42

C. SB 2'S SECONDARY TITLE DOES NOT SAVE THE
OFFICIAL TITLE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY

44

X. CONCLUSION

47

ADDENDUM A: THE COMPLAINT
ADDENDUM B: THE LOWER COURT'S RULING
ADDENDUM C: TECSERVE V. STONEWARE, INC.,
No. 2:08-cv-144-TS (slip opinion) (D. Utah, August 4, 2008)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS

Page

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 26

19

Utah Constitution, Article V

29

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 1

24

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Sections 1,
2, 3,4, 5, 6,7, 9, lOff

22

Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 22

9ff

Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 8(3)

29

Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 2

38

Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 3

38

Washington Constitution, Article II, Section 19

25

STATUTES
Utah Code, Section 78A-3-102(3)(j)

9

RULES
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

9ff

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

9ff

CASES
AFL v. Langley, 168 P.2d 831 (Idaho 1946)

34

Baker v. Department of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1931)

14ff

Carter v. State Tax Commission, 96 P.2d 727 (Utah 1979)

28ff

City of North Miami v. Florida Defenders of the Environment,
481 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1986)

26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

Colorado General Assembly v. Owens, 136 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2006)

29

Connors v. Pratt, 112 P. 399 (Utah 1910)

19

Department ofEduc. v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1982)

26

Ex Parte Georgetown County Water & Sewer Dist.,
327 S.E.2d 654 (S.C. 1985)

27

Fletcher v. Peck, 12 U. S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810)

21

In re Woodward, 384 P.2d 110 (Utah 1963)

38

Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77 (Utah 1978)

15ff

Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 P.2d 870 (Utah 1957)

20

Litchfield Elementary, Etc. v. Babbitt,
608 P.2d 792 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)

27

Marioneauxv. Cutler, 91 P. 355(1907)

15ff

McGuire v. U. of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (1979)

15

Pass v. Kanell, 100 P.2d 972 (Utah 1940)

22ff

Petty v. Utah State Bd. Of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1939)

28

Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P.2d 173 (Wash. 1951)

30ff

Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County,
51 P.2d 645 (Utah 1935)

41

Ritchie v. Richards, 47 P. 670 (1896)

40ff

Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 148 P. 1104 (Utah 1915)

20ff

Saville v. Corless, 151 P. 51 (Utah 1915)

41

Sellers v. Frohmiller, 24 P.2d 666 (Ariz. 1933)

27

State ex rel. Davis v. Cutler, 95 P. 1071 (Utah 1908)

28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin, 631 P.2d 668 (Kan. 1981)

27

State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647 (Utah 1944)

20

State v. Beddo, 63 P. 96 (Utah 1900)

19

State v. Buker, 64 P. 1118 (Utah 1901)

19

State v. Edwards, 95 P. 367 (Utah 1908)

14ff

State v. McCornish, 201 P. 637 (Utah 1921)

14ff

State v. McNally, 64 P. 765 (Utah 1901)

19

State v. Morrej, 64 P. 764 (Utah 1901)

19

State v. Olson, 205 P. 357 (Utah 1922)

34

State v. Yelle, 342 P.2d 588 (Wash. 1959)

41

Stroke v. Court ofAppeals, 704 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1986)

27

Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers,
197 P.2d 477 (Utah 1948)

28ff

University of Utah v. Shurtleff, 144 P.3d 1109 (Utah 2006)

38

Utah School Boards v. State Bd. ofEduc,
17 P.3d 1125 (Utah 2001)

38

Utah State Fair Ass 'n v. Green, 249 P. 1016 (Utah 1926)

14ff

Washington State Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1999)

25ff

Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center,
67 P.3d 436 (Utah 2002)

9

SECONDARY AUTHORITIES
1A N. J. Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION,Section 17:1 (6th ed. 2002 rev.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

29

I

Catalano, "The Single Subject Rule: A Check on
Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling," 3 EMERGING ISSUES
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 (1990)

21ff

Denning and Smith, "Uneasy Riders: The Case for
a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment," 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957

21ff

Dragich, "State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and
Clear Title Challenges," 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 103 (2001)
21ff
Figinski, "Maryland's Constitutional One-subject Rule: Neither a
Dead Letter Nor an Undue Restriction," 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363
(1998)
21
Gillette, "Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local
Government Law," 80 VA. L. REV. 625 (1994)
21
Greenwood, Durham, and Wyer, "Utah's Constitution; Distinctively
Undistinctive," THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN
STATES (Connor and Hammonds, eds., 2008)
22
Hoffer and McDade, "Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio's One-Subject
Rule and the Very Evils It Was Designed to Prevent,"
51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557 (2004)
21
Landau, "The Intended Meaning of 'Legislative Intent' and Its
Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon,"
76 ORE. L. REV. 47 (1997)

21

Linde, "Due Process of Lawmaking," 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) 20
Popkin, "The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,"
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (1988)

21

Ruud, "No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,"
42 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1958)

21ff

Williams, "State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure:
Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement,"
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 797 (1987)

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

IV. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and resolve this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code, Section 78A-3-102(3)(j). The final order from which this appeal is taken
was entered January 31, 2011. This was an order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which certified as final a prior ruling of the lower court
which dismissed two counts of plaintiffs'/appellants' (hereinafter simply
"plaintiffs") complaint ~ which ruling was made May 20, 2009. The notice of
appeal from this January 31st final order was filed March 1, 2011.
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The issue presented on this appeal is whether plaintiffs' complaint below
stated legally sufficient claims, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, that SB 2 2d Substitute (hereinafter simply "SB 2"), an omnibus
education bill enacted in the 2008 general session of the Utah State Legislature,
violated the so-called single subject and clear title provisions of Utah Constitution,
Article VI, Section 22.
This is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness; no deference is
given to the lower court's decision in this regard. See, e.g., Wood v. University of
Utah Medical Center, 67 P.3d 436, 439 (Utah 2002).
The constitutionality of SB 2 was put at issue by plaintiffs' complaint which
is in the record at R. 1-36. The legal sufficiency of the complaint was raised by
defendants' motion to dismiss. R. 37-94. Plaintiffs resisted defendants' motion, R.
279-308, but the lower court overruled plaintiffs' arguments, R. 707-718. The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

lower court certified its ruling as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. R. 823-824. This appeal was taken from that finalized ruling.
R. 938-940.
VI. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The outcome of this appeal turns upon the interpretation of Utah
Constitution, Article VI, Section 22. Article VI, Section 22, requires the Utah
State Legislature to observe certain procedures in the enactment of bills into law.
Article VI, Section 22, provides, in full, as follows: "Every bill shall be read by
title three separate times in each house except in cases where two-thirds of the
house where such bill is pending suspend this requirement. Except general
appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no
bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly
expressed in its title. The vote upon the final passage of all bills shall be by yeas
and nays and entered upon the respective journals of the house in which the vote
occurs. No bill or joint resolution shall be passed except with the assent of the
majority of all members elected to each house of the Legislature." (Emphasis
supplied.)
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are a combination of elected legislators, former legislators,
elected officials, government servants, and good citizens who have a stake in
ensuring that the process by which bills become law at the Utah State Legislature
is fair and transparent. In 2008, the Legislature enacted SB 2, an omnibus
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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education bill. Plaintiffs believed that this enactment violated the so-called single
subject and clear title provisions of Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 22.
They filed a complaint in the lower court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
in that regard.
Plaintiffs' complaint is found in the record below at R. 1-36, and, for the
convenience of the Court, is reproduced as Addendum A to this brief. The
complaint, when fairly read as required by Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, contains the allegations which are detailed below.
The Utah State Legislature passed SB 2 in its 2008 general session and that
bill was signed by the Governor of the state of Utah and became law.
SB 2, as ultimately enacted, is so-called omnibus, "Christmas Treen
legislation. But it did not start as one bill at the beginning of the session. Rather,
it originated as 14 pieces of proposed legislation which were introduced, reviewed,
considered in committee, debated on the floor, and, in some instances, actually
voted upon and defeated as separate bills.
These 14, separate bills were bundled, in the last hours of the legislative
session, into one bill, SB 2. In this eleventh-hour bundling, SB 2 combined
budgetary and appropriations measures with substantive law. It combined bills
which had been voted down by an entire house or defeated in committee with
other bills which, because of popularity or need, were sure to pass. It combined
bills which bore no necessary or logical relation to each other, including measures
which were keyed to administration by different departments of state government
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

and which were codified in or cross-referenced to various titles throughout the
Utah Code.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the purpose of the single subject
requirement in Article VI, Section 22, is to prevent log-rolling. The complaint
alleged that SB 2 was the product of log-rolling and therefore offensive to Article
VI, Section 22, in three respects. First, SB 2 combined budget measures with
substantive law. This not only entails two subjects within the meaning of the
single subject rule, but also, and more important, such bundling uses the exigency
of appropriations to leverage enactment of the minority-supported substantive
measure. Second, SB 2 combined 14 bills, all of which had gone through the
legislative process as separate measures, into one bill; 3 of the 14 bills actually had
been defeated on the house floor or in committee hearings; however, these
defeated bills, at the eleventh hour, were revived and bundled with the 11 other,
more popular measures, thereby achieving a passage into law which, absent
bundling, could not have occurred. Third, even if SB 2's enactment through logrolling isn't obvious when analyzed under the two tests noted above, it is apparent
when viewed under the lens of a third approach which often is employed in single
subject jurisprudence. Even where bundled bills bear a surface similarity, they do
not comprise a single subject within the meaning of provisions such as Article VI,
Section 22, if they have no necessary or logical relation to each other. Whether a
necessary or logical relation exists is determined by an examination of several
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factors, all of which, in this case, point to the omnibus, rather than singular,
character of SB 2.
Plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that SB 2 violated the clear title
requirement of Article VI, Section 22, a mandate that is distinct and separate from
the single subject rule. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that SB 2's title, "Minimum
School Program Budget Amendments" was misleading and lacked transparency
for a number of reasons. The title was under-inclusive, contrary to our state's
judicial construction of Article VI, Section 22. And it was misleading for several
reasons, including, for example, that the reference to "budget program," hid the
fact that the bill contained substantive measures which had been bundled with SB
2 in the final hours of the legislative session. The other reasons that the title was
misleading are alleged in plaintiffs' complaint and discussed in the argument
below.
Defendants moved to dismiss the first two counts of plaintiffs' complaint —
those which alleged violations under the single subject and clear title provisions of
Article VI, Section 22 — for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court
granted this motion,1 then, later, certified that ruling as a final, appealable order.
Plaintiffs thereafter brought this appeal.

1

In ruling that plaintiffs' complaint was legally insufficient, the lower court relied
upon a decision from the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
TecServe v. Stoneware, Inc., 2:08-cv-144-TS (slip opinion) (D. Utah, August 4,
2008). For the convenience of the Court, the TecServe opinion is reproduced in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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VIII. SUMMARY OF SINGLE SUBJECT ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs brought this civil action against defendants, alleging that SB 2, an
omnibus education bill passed in the 2008 general session of the Utah State
Legislature, was unlawfully enacted and, therefore, should be declared invalid
under the so-called single subject and clear title provisos of Article VI, Section 22,
of the Utah Constitution. Utah's jurisprudence in this regard holds that every
application of Article VI, Section 22, is sui generis, dependent upon the particular
legislation and peculiar facts involved in the case at hand. Prior precedents or
other decisions are merely guides along this decision-making path. 2

Addendum C to this brief. In setting forth the standard of review for motions
under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Stewart, in
TecServe, relied upon the recently revised federal standard announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544
(2007). And, indeed, the lower court in our case, at pages 9 and 10 of its ruling
(which is reproduced as Addendum B to this brief) quotes from and relies upon the
language of Twombly as incorporated in the opinion in TecServe. With respect,
plaintiffs believe that their complaint easily meets the more rigorous pleading
requirements set forth under Twombly's new gloss on federal rule 12(b)(6). But of
equal importance, this Court has not adopted Twombly's pleading rationale for
purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Utah Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure recently issued a report,
"Proposed Rules Governing Civil Discovery," which, at pages 8-9, expressly
recommends against the adoption in Utah of heightened pleading requirements
such as those articulated in Twombly and its progeny at the federal level.
2

See, e.g., Baker v. Department of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Utah 1931)
("\ .. no hard and fast rule can be formulated which is applicable to all cases, but
each must to a very large extent be determined in accordance with the peculiar
circumstances and conditions thereof, and . . . the decisions of the courts are
valuable merely as illustrations or guides in applying these general rules . . . ' "
[citation omitted]); Utah State FairAss'n v. Green, 249 P. 1016, 1025 (Utah 1926)
(same); State v. McCornish, 201 P. 637, 639 (Utah 1921) (same); State v.
Edwards, 95 P. 367, 368 (Utah 1908) ("... no hard and fast rule can be formulated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Our case will be no exception to this rule. As indicated here and below (in
the discussion of the clear title requirement of Article VI, Section 22), the issues
raised on this appeal, in several respects, will be matters of first impression. For
the first time in Utah history this Court will have to decide whether the bundling
of bills with substantive law, budgetary amendments, and appropriations measures
runs afoul of Article VI, Section 22. Similarly, although Utah's opinions speak of
the anti-log-rolling purpose to be served by Article VI, Section 22, no case ever
has involved facts where the actual occurrence of this parliamentary vice is
apparent from the legislative record which courts permissibly may consider3 - as
opposed to opinions where courts endeavor to "decipher" or "de-code" a logrolling violation from the face of a bill.
As noted above, when Article VI, Section 22, says that "no bill shall be
passed containing more than one subject," this means that no bill shall be passed
which is applicable to all cases, but each case must to a very large extent be
determined in accordance with the peculiar circumstances and conditions thereof.
.. the decisions of the courts are valuable merely as illustrations or guides in
applying these general rules[ ]"); Marioneaux v. Cutler, 91 P. 355, 358 (1907) (". .
. a hard and fast rule governing all cases cannot be formulated . . . no general rule
on the subject can safely be formulated[ ]").
3

Utah apparently adheres to a modified version of the so-called "enrolled bill
doctrine," which permits courts to rely upon the legislative journals as evidence in
determining whether a violation of Article VI, Section 22, has occurred, but
forbids them from looking beyond these journals to debates on the floor of the
House or Senate. See, Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77 (Utah 1978). See also,
Dean v. Rampton, 538 P.2d 169 (Utah 1975) (use of journals permitted to resolve
dispute under signature requirements of Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 24).
But see, McGuire v. U. of Utah Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786, 790 (1979) (court
relies upon floor debates in resolving clear title dispute under Article VI, Section
22).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

which is the subject of log-rolling. The phrase, "one subject," is the historical
code, adopted by many state constitutions, to express this purpose. Log-rolling
sometimes is obvious from the circumstances surrounding the passage of a bill for example, when one bill initially fails on its merits, but then, through
combination with an appropriations rider or more popular measure, achieves
enactment.
More often, however, log-rolling occurs behind the scenes and is not
obvious. In these instances, the "one subject" language becomes a tool by which
courts analyze and ascertain which bills bear the earmarks or "badges" of logrolling. In these cases, if the parts of a bill have no necessary relationship
vertically and horizontally - that is, if they do not relate meaningfully to a larger
purpose and as parts, working together, in serving that goal - they are deemed to
be the product of log-rolling in contravention of the single subject rule.
In testing whether the parts of a bill "work together," courts in general and
this Court in particular have looked to a variety of factors. These include whether
the parts of the bill have a necessary internal relationship, whether the subject
matter of the subparts of the bill historically have been treated together, whether
the bill is administered by a single agency, and whether money measures are
combined with substantive legislation.
As demonstrated below, SB 2 fails all of these single subject tests. The
circumstances surrounding passage of SB 2, as alleged in the complaint, show that
it obviously was the product of log-rolling. All of the 14 bills that ultimately
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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became SB 2 were introduced, reviewed, debated, and voted upon as single
subjects. Several of the bills actually were defeated by majority vote in the House
of Representatives or failed to obtain committee approval in the House or Senate.
All ultimately were rolled into one bill, SB 2, together with budgetary
amendments and appropriations riders, showing that, but for the combination of
money measures and popular bills, these previously defeated bills would not have
passed.
Even without this obvious log-rolling which appears from the record of the
legislative proceedings, SB 2 facially does not qualify as a single subject for
purposes of Article VI, Section 22. This also is clear from the allegations in the
complaint - or inferences fairly to be drawn from those allegations. SB 2's parts
may be about "education," but those educational parts are omnibus within the
meaning of the single subject rule, including, as they do, everything from
computer training for pre-school children to financial literacy for adult learners
and from an international baccaulareate program to domestic arts initiatives.
These omnibus parts, moreover, bear no relationship to each other. They
never before, speaking historically, have been packaged together in a
conglomerate bill. The subparts of SB 2 are so disparate in subject-matter,
purpose, and effect that the legislature has provided for their implementation and
administration by entirely different agencies, the Utah State Board of Education,
local school boards, and the Utah Department of Human Resource Management,
the latter of which traditionally has nothing whatsoever to do with educational
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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affairs in the state of Utah. In still another subpart, SB 2 proscribes any
administrative role for the Utah State Board of Education and delegates
supervisory power to private businesses. The intermixture of general legislation
with money measures also indicates a facial violation of the single subject rule.
In showing how SB 2 violates the single subject requirement of Article VI,
Section 22, plaintiffs' argument will proceed in 4 stages. First, plaintiffs will make
clear how the single subject requirement, in effect, is a prohibition against logrolling. Second, plaintiffs will show that, by combining money measures with
substantive law, SB 2 violated the single subject rule. Third, plaintiffs will
demonstrate that SB 2?s passage, on the face of the legislative record, was the
product of log-rolling. Fourth, and finally, plaintiffs argue that, independent of the
legislative record, the contents of SB 2, when analyzed under traditional single
subject tests, evidence a violation of the single subject mandate.
A. THE PURPOSES SERVED BY ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22
IN UTAH'S CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 22, in relevant part, states that,
"Except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general
revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which
shall be clearly expressed in its title." Since ratification as part of Utah's
Constitution in 1896, this provision has been treated in no fewer than 45 Utah
Supreme Court opinions. These opinions contain a litany of guidelines for the
application of Article VI, Section 22. But all of these guidelines may be distilled
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down to the following principles: Article VI, Section 22, is a mandatory limitation
upon legislative power.4 Hence, although every law enjoys a presumption of
constitutionality, this presumption is rebuttable upon a showing that the manner in

4

See, e.g., State v. Beddo, 63 P. 96, 97 (Utah 1900) ("[t]hese provisions are clearly
restrictive and mandatory[ ]"). In Beddo, a defendant's conviction for rape was
declared void because the statute which had conferred jurisdiction upon a district
attorney's office to conduct the prosecution was enacted in violation of the
procedural requirements of Article VI, Section 22. Beddo was followed in State v.
Morrey, 64 P. 764, 765 (Utah 1901) which overturned a conviction for adultery
upon the same ground. Underscoring the mandatory character of these
constitutional requirements, the Court said, "Such is our conclusion,
notwithstanding the statement of counsel for the prosecution that 'many criminals
of the lowest order' must be released under that decision. It would seem needless
to say that, if such be a fact, it can have no weight with a court in passing upon the
constitutionality of a statute. Nor does such fact furnish any reason whatever for
upholding an enactment made in violation of the fundamental law." See also,
State v. Buker, 64 P. 1118 (Utah 1901) (overturning conviction for adultery); State
v. McNally, 64 P. 765 (Utah 1901) (overturning conviction for arson); Connors v.
Pratt, 112 P. 399, 400 (Utah 1910) (overturning conviction for murder).
Constitutional mandates, in other words, may not be bent or broken on the altars of
expediency or convenience. This Court consistently has maintained that these
procedural requirements are mandatory, not merely directory, in character. See,
e.g., Baker v. Department of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Utah 1931) (great
weight of authority holds that this constitutional provision is "mandatory"); State
v. Edwards, 95 P. 367, 368 (1908) ("[t]he provision is mandatory, and may not be
ignored[ ]"); Marioneaux v. Cutler, 91 P. 355, 359 (Utah 1907) (legislature "may
not disregard" these constitutional requirements or evade them "by simply making
the legislative intention clear in the act itself [ ]").
Some Utah cases, in affirming this result, cite Utah Constitution, Article I, Section
26, which states that, "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise."
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which the law achieved enactment was inimical to the purposes to be served by
Article VI, Section 22.5
The central inquiry in this case, therefore, is what purposes are served by
Article VI, Section 22, and was SB 2 passed in derogation of those ends. Just as
the judicial branch is concerned with "due process" in the adjudication of disputes,
our legislative department, because of Article VI, Section 22, must observe a form
of "due process," embracing the principles of fairness and transparency, in the
enactment of laws.6 Speaking generally, this means that laws which are the
product of fraud, chicanery, trickery, or surprise are interdicted by Article VI,
Section 22. Indeed, provisions such as Article VI, Section 22, were insisted upon

5

See, e.g., Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 P.2d 870, 873 (Utah 1957) ("[t]he title and
the act should be surveyed in the light of the purpose[s] of [Article VI, Section 22]
of the Constitution [one of] which is to guard against the surreptitious or
inadvertent inclusion of subjects in legislation without legislators and the public
being aware of its contents[ ]"); State v. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647, 655 (Utah 1944)
("'... the constitutional provision should be so applied as to guard against the real
evil which it was intended to prevent[ ] ' " [citation omitted]); Baker v. Department
of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Utah 1931) ("'. .. that the constitutional
provision should be so applied as to guard against the real evil which it was
intended to meet. ..'" [citation omitted]); Utah State Fair Assyn v. Green, 249 P.
1016, 1025, (Utah 1926) (same); State v. McCornish, 201 P. 637, 639 (Utah 1921)
(same); Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 148 P. 1104, 1109 (Utah 1915) (Article VI,
Section 22, should be applied to effect its purpose, namely, "in preventing the
combination of incongruous subjects neither of which could be passed when
standing alone[ ]"); State v. Edwards, 95 P. 367, 368 (Utah 1908) (".. .that the
constitutional provision should be so applied as to guard against the real evil
which it was intended to meet...").
6

See, e.g., Linde, "Due Process of Lawmaking," 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976).

7

Constitutional provisions like those found in Article VI, Section 22, of Utah's
Constitution, by most accounts, had their origin in reaction to the infamous Yazoo
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Act passed by the Georgia state legislature in 1795. The bill, a product of an
obscure title and outright bribery, approved a land deal. A later session of the
same legislature undid the deal, but, in the meantime, the original grantees had
sold their land to persons who claimed the status of bona fide purchasers for value.
The validity of this status was questioned in litigation and sustained on federal
constitutional grounds by the United States Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 12
U. S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810). Fletcher held, as a matter of federal law incidental to the
constitutional challenge, that courts could not explore legislative motives, however
corrupt, in determining the validity of legislation. Many state constitutional
conventions opposed this federal rule, however, and, in its place, established
remedial measures so that the judicial branch, in stipulated instances, might
overrule legislative misrule. See, e.g., Dragich, "State Constitutional Restrictions
on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single
Subject, and Clear Title Challenges," 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 103, 104 (2001);
Ruud, "'No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,'" 42 MINN. L. REV.
389,391-392(1958).
Most state constitutions have provisions which are similar to or the same as
Article VI, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution. The legal literature discussing
these provisions is substantial. For a sampling, see, e.g., Catalano, "The Single
Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian Logrolling," 3 EMERGING ISSUES
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 (1990); Denning and Smith, "Uneasy
Riders: The Case for a Truth-in-Legislation Amendment," 1999 UTAH L. REV.
957; Dragich, "State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:
Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title
Challenges," 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 103 (2001); Figinski, "Maryland's
Constitutional One-Subject Rule: Neither a Dead Letter Nor an Undue
Restriction," 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 363 (1998); Gillette, "Expropriation and
Institutional Design in State and Local Government Law," 80 VA. L. REV. 625
(1994); Hoffer and McDade, "Of Disunity and Logrolling: Ohio's One-Subject
Rule and the Very Evils It Was Designed to Prevent," 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557
(2004); Landau, "The Intended Meaning of 'Legislative Intent' and Its
Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon," 76 ORE. L. REV. 47 (1997);
Popkin, "The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation," 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 541 (1988); Ruud, "'No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,'" 42
MINN. L. REV. 389 (1958); Williams, "State Constitutional Limits on Legislative
Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement," 48 U. PITT. L.
REV. 797 (1987).
Utah Supreme Court Justice Christine Durham, writing as a historian, notes that
Article VI, Section 22, and related measures in Utah's constitution debar conduct
"which had been a source of much corruption in mid-nineteenth-century
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by state-constitution-makers in the 19th Century, because of a popular consensus
that legislatures too easily could be corrupted by special interests, absent this sort
of substantive and procedural limitation.8 And, in particular, it means that laws
which are passed as a result of "log-rolling" are unconstitutional in light of Article

,

VI, Section 22. Log-rolling occurs whenever bills are bundled as a means to
achieve passage in the event that a bill or bills, standing alone, cannot. In these
. . . . . . .

\

instances, a legislative minority, through combination with another bloc of votes,
can become a majority or at least a plurality for the bill in question. Article VI,
Section 22, is designed to ensure that a bill's passage is based upon substantial

i

merit rather than parliamentary maneuver, and that the fundamental requirement
that every bill achieve passage by a constitutional majority not be defeated or
[

9

impaired by artificial, anti-majoritarian manipulations.

legislatures." Greenwood, Durham, and Wyer, "Utah's Constitution:
Distinctively Undistinctive," THE CONSTITUTIONALISM OF AMERICAN
STATES, at 658 & n. 32 (Connor and Hammonds, eds., 2008). Article VI,
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 22, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33, all
mandate or encourage, directly or indirectly, ethical conduct, fair process, the
accountability of legislators, and public disclosure of legislatively related
transactions.

(

i

8

See, e.g., Thompson, "The Theory of State Constitutions," 1966 UTAH L. REV.
542,545.
9

In Pass v. Kartell 100 P.2d 972, 978 (Utah 1940), Justice McDonough, although
speaking in dissent, articulates these purposes and principles by quoting from a
leading treatise respecting single subject and clear title jurisprudence: "The
mischief sought to be remedied by the requirement of a single subject or object of
legislation was the practice of bringing together in one bill matters having no
necessary or proper connection with each other but often entirely unrelated and
even incongruous. By the practice of incorporating in proposed legislation of a
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*

i

meritorious character provisions not deserving of general favor but which,
standing alone and on their own merits, were likely to be rejected, measures which
could not have been carried without such a device and which were sometimes of a
pernicious character were often incorporated in the laws; for, to secure needed and
desirable legislation, members of the legislature were, by this means, often
induced to sanction and actually vote for provisions which, if presented as
independent subjects of legislation, would not have received their support. It was
also the practice to include in the same bill wholly unrelated provisions, with the
view of combining in favor of the bill the supporters of each, and thus securing the
passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed on its own merits. To
do away with this hodge podge or 'log rolling' legislation was one, and perhaps the
primary, object of these constitutional provisions. Another abuse that developed
in legislative bodies was the practice of enacting laws under false and misleading
titles, thereby concealing from the members of the legislature, and from the
people, the true nature of the laws so enacted. It is to prevent surreptitious
legislation in this manner that the subject or object of a law is required to be stated
in the title. While the objects of these constitutional provisions are variously
stated, the authorities are agreed that they were adopted to remedy these and
similar abuses. The purposes of these constitutional provisions have been
summarized as follows: (1) to prevent 'log rolling' legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the
titles give no intimation, and (3) to apprise the people of the subject of legislation
under consideration.'" (Citation omitted.)
Likewise, Utah State FairAss'n, 249 P. 1016, 1024 (Utah 1925) quotes a treatise
on state constitutional law which observes that: "The practice of bringing
together into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary
connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all, and thus
secure the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed upon its
own merits, was one both corruptive of the Legislator and dangerous to the state.
It was scarcely more so, however, than another practice, also intended to be
remedied by this provision, by which, through dexterous management, clauses
were inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage
secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of
their intention and effect. There was no design by this clause to embarrass
legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation,
and thus multiplying their number; but the framers of the Constitution meant to
put an end to legislation of the vicious character referred to, which was little less
than a fraud upon the public, and to require that in every case the proposed
measure should stand upon its own merits, and that the Legislature should be fairly
satisfied of its design when required to pass upon it.'" (citation omitted). See also,
Baker v. Department of Registration, 3 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Utah 1931).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

B. SB 2 VIOLATES THE SINGLE SUBJECT
RULE BY BUNDLING SUBSTANTIVE LAW WITH
BUDGETARY AMENDMENTS AND APPROPRIATIONS MEASURES
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that SB 2 combines substantive law with
budgetary amendments and appropriations measures. In addition, the complaint
alleges that certain bills were introduced as single subjects in their own right,
dealing with distinct substantive issues. These bills failed on the floor of the
House and in committee in the House and the Senate. They were revived at the
end of the session, bundled with budget amendments and appropriations measures,
and thus achieved passage via SB 2.10

The importance of majority rule receives expression twice in our state constitution,
once in Article VI, Section 1, and again in Article VI, Section 22.
10

The complaint plainly alleges that money was the key in obtaining passage of
these previously failed bills through the omnibus maneuver. Paragraph 83 is one
example of many which can be cited in this regard. Paragraph 83, in part, avers:
"In particular, and without limiting the foregoing, plaintiffs point the Court to
statements made by a member of the legislature in the wake of SB 2's passage.
Michael Waddoups, the Republican Senator from District 6, issued a written
statement to all delegates at the Salt Lake County Republican Convention on or
about May 10, 2008. The statement reads, in pertinent part, This funding bill [SB
2] was presented to the legislature the day before the session ended leaving no
time to debate the bill and rewrite a new one. It was put together by House and
Senate Leadership. This is not the way funding is traditionally handled. I thought
it was wrong then and I still think it is wrong. However, I, along with almost
every other legislator, voted for it because we were faced with the problem that
school funding was included in this bill. Had we not voted for the bill education
would have remained unfunded. Many of the senators were upset about it and we
are currently in the process of seeing it never happens again.'"
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The bundling of substantive law and budgetary amendments and
appropriations measures, however, is a. per se violation of the single subject rule.
This is because (a) substantive laws and money bills are deemed to be different
subjects for purposes of the rule, and, (b) in any event, the conjunction of law and
money is log-rolling in contravention of the rule.
Washington State Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1999) (en
banc) illustrates these points. The Washington State Legislature opinion applied
Washington state's single subject rule11 to a bill which combined substantive
welfare legislation with general appropriation measures, and declared this
combination unconstitutional. Id. at 362-263.
In reaching this result, the Court reasoned that substantive laws and money
measures are inherently different subjects, two different species of legislative
enactment, for purposes of the single subject rule: "'An appropriation bill is not a
law in its ordinary sense. It is not a rule of action. It has no moral or divine
sanction. It defines no rights and punishes no wrongs. It is purely lex scripta. It
is a means only to the enforcement of law, the maintenance of good order, and the
life of the state government. Such bills pertain only to the administrative functions
of government.'" Washington State Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d at 362 (citation
omitted).
11

Washington Constitution, Article II, Section 19, at the time of the opinion,
provided that, "No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be
expressed in the title." This "single subject" language is virtually identical to that
found in Utah Constitution, Article VI, Section 22.
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The Court next explained that, since money bills are a "compulsory
outcome" of each session of every legislature, such bills are a "convenient target"
for the kind of horse trading that becomes log-rolling. Washington State
Legislature v. State, 985 P.2d at 362 & n. 6: "Moreover, by their omnibus nature,
budget bills offer too tempting a target for legislative logrolling, which art. II
[Section] 19 forbids. Issues that failed on their merits may not be resurrected by
their inclusion in an operating budget bill. Policy legislation must pass or fail on
its own merits, taking the normal course of a bill." Id. at 362 (citation omitted).
See also, Flanders v. Morris, 558 P.2d 769 (Wash. 1977) (substantive law which

<

could not pass on its own merit achieves enactment "by being slipped into a 45page appropriations bill;" this violates single subject rule).
i

This Court should adopt the reasoning and result of the Washington State
19

Legislature opinion.

The Utah Supreme Court, so far as plaintiffs' research has
i

12

Washington state, of course, is not the only state which follows this rule. For
other examples, please see, e.g., City of North Miami v. Florida Defenders of the
Environment, 481 So.2d 1196, 1196 (Fla. 1986) (bill which combined amendment
to substantive law and appropriations measure held unconstitutional under Florida
state constitution's version of single subject rule; "[w]e hold that [the bill] violates
[the single subject rule] of the Florida Constitution because it is an appropriations
bill that changes and amends existing law on subjects other than appropriations . . .
[citations omitted]"); Department ofEduc.v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 459-461 (Fla.
1982) (bill combining substantive restriction on appropriated funds with
appropriations measure held unconstitutional under Florida state constitution's
version of single subject rule; "[a]n extensive body of constitutional law teaches
that the purpose of [the single subject rule] is to ensure that every proposed
enactment is considered with deliberation and on its own merits. A lawmaker
must not be placed in the position of having to accept a repugnant provision in
order to achieve adoption of a desired one. [Citations omitted] . . . . Through a
number of cases decided over many years this court has attempted to make clear to
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\

i

i

disclosed, never has ruled directly on this precise issue; to that extent, our case is a
matter of first impression. But the seminal commentator on single subject
the Legislature that under our constitutional plan for the lawful exercise of
governmental powers an appropriations act is not the proper place for the
enactment of general public policies on matters other than appropriations.
[Citations omitted]. In [one case], the Court said: The enactment of laws
providing for general appropriations involves different considerations and indeed
different procedures than does the enactment of laws on other subjects. Our state
constitution demands that each bill dealing with substantive matters be scrutinized
separately through a comprehensive process which will ensure that all
considerations prompting legislative action are fully aired. Provisions on
substantive topics should not be ensconced in an appropriations bill in order to
logroll or to circumvent the legislative process normally applicable to such action.
Similarly, general appropriations bills should not be cluttered with extraneous
matters which might cloud the legislative mind when it should be focused solely
on appropriations matters[ ] ' " [Citation omitted]); State ex rel. Stephan v. Carlin,
631 P.2d 668, 673 (Kan. 1981) (bill combining general legislation and
appropriations measures declared unconstitutional under Kansas constitution's
virtually identical version of single subject rule; "[t]he inclusion of unrelated
legislation in an important and extensive appropriations bill, at the end of the
session, is particularly illustrative of the possible harm [the single subject rule] is
intended to prevent[ ]"); Ex Parte Georgetown County Water & Sewer Dist, 327
S.E.2d 654, 656 (S. C. 1985) (bill which combined special-purpose district voting
provisions and appropriations measures held unconstitutional under South
Carolina constitution's virtually identical version of single subject rule; "[t]he
subject of an appropriations bill is solely to make appropriations to meet the
ordinary expenses of state government and to direct the manner in which the funds
are to be expended[ ]"); Stroke v. Court of Appeals, 704 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.
1986) (bill which combined salary modification for state official with
appropriations measures declared unconstitutional under Texas version of singlesubject rule; "[a] rider which attempts to alter existing substantive law is a general
law which may not be included in an appropriations act[ ]"). Cf. Sellers v.
Frohmiller, 24 P.2d 666, 669 (Ariz. 1933) (appropriation bill and general
legislation are different subjects; "'[a]s has been observed in well-reasoned cases,
if the practice of incorporating legislation of general chacter in an appropriation
bill should be allowed, then all sorts of ill conceived, questionable, if not vicious,
legislation could be proposed with the threat, too, that, if not assented to and
passed, the appropriations would be defeated[ ] ' " [citation omitted]); Litchfield
Elementary, Etc. v. Babbitt, 608 P.2d 792, 800-803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (". . . the
appropriations process cannot be used for legislation[ ]" [citations omitted]).
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constitutional issues, Millard Ruud, citing dicta from two Utah Supreme Court
opinions, has implied that Utah would follow those holdings which forbid the
intermixture of law and money.13 Another Utah opinion, overlooked by Ruud,
states that the bundling of revenue measures and regulatory law, if it were to
occur, would violate the single subject proviso of Article VI, Section 22.14 Still
another Utah case analogically implies the same outcome.15 And other authorities
generally concur that the rationale of Washington State Legislature is a sound
application of single subject principles.16
Using budget amendments and appropriations riders to leverage the passage
of substantive laws offends the policies and principles of the single subject

^ See, Ruud, "'No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,'" 42 MINN. L.
REV. 389, 433 and 434 & ns. 173 and 174 (1958), citing dictum from State ex rel.
Davis v. Cutler, 95 P. 1071, 1072-73 (Utah 1908) and the reasoning from Thomas
v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d 477, 496-497 (Utah 1948).
14

See, Carter v. State Tax Commission, 96 P.2d 727, 733-734 (Utah 1939)
(bundling of revenue measure and regulatory law would violate clear title and
single subject provisos of Article VI, Section [22]) {dictum).
15

See, Petty v. Utah State Bd Of Regents, 595 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Utah 1979)
(appropriations measure cannot be read to amend substantive law: " . . . [i]t is
important to have in mind that the purpose of the Appropriations Act is to allocate
finances, and not to affect substantive changes in the law on other matters[ ]").
l6

See, e.g., Catalano, 'The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian
Logrolling," 1990 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
77, 79 and 80; Denning and Smith, "Uneasy Riders: The Case for a Truth-inLegislation Amendment," 1999 UTAH L. REV. 957, 963; Ruud, "'No Law Shall
Embrace More Than One Subject,'" 42 MINN. L. REV. 398, 413-443 (1958). Of
course, the case law, cited above in footnote 12 of this brief, likewise supports this
analysis.
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language in Article VI, Section 22. The complaint alleges that this is exactly what
transpired during passage of SB 2. This violation is underscored, according to the
allegations of the complaint, because some of the substantive laws were defeated
by majority vote in the House or did not have sufficient merit, on their own, to
survive committee hearings, and, but for the fulcrum of money, never would have
become law. Hence, the complaint states a claim in this respect under Rule
12(b)(6).17

The single subject rule also is designed to protect the governor's line-item veto
power under state constitutions, a power which often is threatened or undercut by
legislation which combines substantive law and appropriations measures. See, e.g.
1A N. J. Singer, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Section
17:1, at 8-9 (6th ed. 2002 rev.). If this matter goes to trial, plaintiffs will endeavor
to show that this may have occurred in connection with SB 2.
Utah's governor is given line-item veto power in Article VII, Section 8(3), of
Utah's Constitution which provides, in pertinent part, that, "The governor may
disapprove any item of appropriation contained in any bill while approving other
portions of the bill." According to some accounts, Governor Huntsman may hold
the view that he cannot exercise his line-item veto power except in cases where the
bill is strictly an appropriations measure without substantive provisions, perhaps
following the reasoning in cases such as Colorado General Assembly v. Owens,
136 P.3d 262, 273-274 (Colo. 2006) (en banc). Thus, he may have concluded that
his line-item veto power was emasculated by SB 2, since that legislation, as
already noted, combined general legislation with budget amendments and
appropriations riders. In the event, the enactment of omnibus legislation of this
sort, not only defeats the anti-log-rolling purpose of Article VI, Section 22, but
also impairs, if it does not entirely compromise, gubernatorial prerogatives under
Article VII, Section 8(3). The latter consequence, of course, inflicts harm upon
the foundational principle of separation of powers under Article V of Utah's
Constitution and presents an additional reason to guard carefully the "due process
in lawmaking" provisions of Article VI, Section 22.
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C. SB 2 IS THE PRODUCT OF LOG-ROLLING AND,
THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE
Even if the Court does not agree that the bundling of substantive law,
budget amendments, and appropriations measures in the same bill is a per se
violation of the single subject rule, SB 2 offends the anti-log-rolling purpose
behind Article VI, Section 22. In this regard, plaintiffs' complaint alleges that SB
2 is the sum of 14 bills, all of which started as single subject measures. All
initially were introduced, reviewed, considered, and debated as separate, standalone legislation. Two of these bills were defeated by majority vote in the House.
Two others lacked sufficient merit to survive committee hearings. These failed
bills were revived and, through bundling in SB 2, were allowed to ride "piggyback" on popular legislation and money measures to enactment at the eleventh
hour of the 2008 general session. Accordingly, the complaint alleges that SB 2 is
the product of log-rolling.
Once again, a Washington case, Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P.2d 173
(Wash. 1951), perfectly illustrates the reason SB 2 must be declared
unconstitutional in this case. In Huntley, the state legislature considered the
passage of two bills; one was an amendment to the tax code and the other was an
appropriations measure. One of these bills failed in the Senate, but, when
combined, they both were enacted into law. When challenged under the single
subject rule, the Court said, "We have here a situation in which neither the
appropriation bill... nor the corporation income tax bill... standing on its own
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merits, could pass the legislature in the special session, but when the proponents of
these measures combined their interests, both were enacted . . . This is the clearest
possible illustration of the kind of 'logrolling,' the 'you-scratch-my-back-and-I'llscratch-yours' situation that the constitutional provision was designed to prevent."
Id. at 178.
The Court quotes from a Pennsylvania opinion, Commonwealth v. Barnett,
which details the reasons for and purposes behind the interdiction of so-called
omnibus bills, which "'became a crying evil, not only from the confusion and
distraction of the legislative mind by the jumbling together of incongruous
subjects, but still more by the facility they afforded to corrupt combinations of
minorities with different interests to force the passage of bills with provisions
which could never succeed if they stood on their separate merits. So common was
this practice that it got a popular name, universally understood as 'logrolling.' A
still more objectionable practice grew up, of putting what is known as a 'rider'
(that is, a new and unrelated enactment or provision) on the appropriation bills,
and thus coercing the executive to approve obnoxious legislation, or bring the
wheels of the government to a stop for want of funds.'" Power, Inc. v. Huntley,
235 P.2d at 178 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
Although the anti-log-rolling purpose of Article VI, Section 22, frequently
has been noted in Utah Supreme Court opinions, none of those opinions has
treated log-rolling facts such as those alleged in the complaint now before this
Court. But the Utah cases, like Huntley, repeatedly instruct that Section 22's
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limitation on legislative power is designed to prevent log-rolling and should be
interpreted and applied to that end.18
With these instructions in view, plaintiffs submit that, if Article VI, Section
22, is to have any meaning whatsoever, it has to be applied to strike down the log-

,

rolling which spawned SB 2 in this case. Put differently, if Article VI, Section 22,
is not so applied to SB 2, it is impossible to imagine a case where it would have
any application at all. In that event, what our constitution and cases describe as a
"mandatory" and "prohibitory" constraint on the way in which the legislature
conducts its business would become meaningless. In short, by alleging that SB 2's

<

passage was based upon the actual occurrence of log-rolling (as distinct from
"divining" the existence of log-rolling through a facial examination of the various
parts of the entire bill, as discussed more fully below), plaintiffs have stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted within the meaning of Rule 12(b)(6).
D. SB 2 VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22,

(

BECAUSE, AS AN OMNIBUS BILL,
IT EMBRACES MORE THAN A SINGLE SUBJECT

(

Even if we ignore the mixture of substantive law with budget amendments
and appropriations measures and the log-rolling that was instrumental to passage
of SB 2, the bill still may offend Article VI, Section 22. This is because,
independent of the actual log-rolling which is apparent from the legislative record,
18

Please see the discussion above, with Utah case citations, under that section of
this brief styled "A.The Purposes Served by Article VI, Section 22, in Utah's
Constitutional Order."
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a facial examination of the bills which comprise SB 2 shows that they represent
multiple subjects in contravention of Article VI, Section 22.
In the lower court, defendants attempted this facial examination and
concluded that, since all 14 bills which were combined into SB 2 pertain to
"education," they all deal with a "single subject" within the meaning of Article VI,
Section 22. But this conclusion proves too much. All legislation may be
classified under at least one heading, such as "government," and, in the event, all
laws would embrace no more than a single subject, depriving Article VI, Section
22, of any real meaning. What is more, an analysis of a bill's character on the
basis of a generic appellation too easily might miss the "real evil" at which this
constitutional proscription is aimed, namely, log-rolling. One's analytical tools,
therefore, should be sharpened to the point which most readily detects and
eradicates such legislative practices. And if generic appellations were conclusive,
legislatures easily could evade this constitutional constraint, by adding
declarations and stating intentions respecting each and every bill, a ploy which in
fact may have been outlawed in an early case interpreting Article VI, Section 22. 19
Hence, looking to the substantive content of particular bills, courts
generally and this Court in particular have required more than merely a vertical
relationship between the various components of an omnibus bill and a generic
heading like "education." They also require some form of meaningful relationship

19

See, e.g., Marioneaux v. Cutler, 91 P. 355, 359 (Utah 1907).
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between the subparts of the bill.

Whether that internal relationship has meaning

or not can be measured by the yardsticks of history, statutory classification,
administrative practice, or the like. When judged by these standards, the subparts
of SB 2 truly can be seen as a "hodge-podge" and "Christmas tree" enactment.
The paucity of internal relationship is apparent, even transparent, upon
examination of the parts which artificially were thrust together at the hurried end
of a busy session in order to make up a whole.
Apart from the exceedingly thin thread of "education," none of the 14 bills
in SB 2 has any "natural" or "necessary" connection to another. One of the bills
which was voted down by the entire House (when it was a single-subject
measure), HB 200, deals with "Early Childhood Learning and Evaluation." This

zu

See, e.g., Pass v. Kartell 100 P.2d 972, 974-975 (Utah 1940) (bill dealt with
common subject of vehicles but vehicle registration and insurance/liability deemed
separate under Article VI, Section 22); AFL v. Langley, 168 P.2d 831 (Idaho 1946)
(bill dealt with common subject of labor unions, but because there was no unified
core the act was declared void).
This Court has used a variety of verbal formulas to get at this problem. See, e.g.,
Utah State FairAss'n v. Green, 249 P. 1016, 1024 (Utah 1926) (Article VI,
Section 22, forbids the combining of subjects "'which, in a legal sense, have no
connection with, or proper relation to each other'" or "'incongruous and unrelated
matters[;]'" statutes will be upheld "if all the parts .. have a natural connection'"
[citations omitted]); State v. Olson, 205 P. 357, 339 (Utah 1922) (one provision is
"of necessity" included with another); State v. McCornish, 201 P. 637, 638 (Utah
1921) (bills must be "cognate and related to each other"); State v. Edwards, 95 P.
367, 369 (Utah 1908) (bills must be "germane or related to one another;" bills may
not be "incongruous or inconsistent"). See also, Pass v. Kanell, 100 P.2d 972, 978
(Utah 1940) ("'... bringing together in one bill matters having no necessary or
proper connection with each other but often entirely unrelated and even
incongruous...'" [citation omitted]) (J. McDonough, dissenting).
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bill creates a program for pre-school children, encouraging their use of computer
technology as a learning tool. Were an evidentiary hearing to be conducted, HB
200 may be shown as nothing more than a legislative boondoggle for a software
91

vendor who had a lobbyist who had a relationship with a proponent of the bill.
But in any case the bill treats pre-school computer programming, and bears no
relationship, whether natural or unnatural, to any other part of SB 2. Another bill
which was voted down by the entire House (when it was a single-subject
measure), HB 278, treats the taxation of school districts as a means to achieve
charter school funding. Nothing else in SB 2 bears even remotely on charter
schools. In short, there is something for everybody in SB 2, money for software
vendors, subsidies for charter schools, adult financial literacy programs, school
textbook vetting mechanisms, teacher salary adjustments, and arts funding. All
play on the theme of education, but there is no instrumental or integrating score.
The result is a dissonant, cacophony of subjects which by no means are single in
the sense intended under Article VI, Section 22.

Zl

See, e.g., Ruud, "'No Law Shall Embrace More Than One Subject,'" 42 MINN.
L. REV. 389, 405 (1958) ("[a]n act which deals with several distinct local or
private interests is suspect; it has the earmarks of log-rolling - of combining
several minority interests to get a majority vote for the whole. The mere fact that
all of the local or private interests relate to a single general subject, such a s . . .
powers of municipal government, should not dissuade the court from finding the
act invalid. The combining of these provisions, all of which could reasonably be
grouped under one general subject or heading, was likely the result of a marriage
of convenience only and not intellectual affinity[ ]").
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SB 2 fails other tests which courts have devised to gauge the quality of the
relationship between multiple subjects in a single bill for purposes of applying
provisions like Article VI, Section 22. There is, for example, no historical
precedent for SB 2's combination of minimum school budget provisions and the
other educational programs found in the legislation.22 As another example, SB 2's
reliance upon three different state agencies (one of which has nothing traditionally
to do with education), in addition to private companies, to administer its
conglomeration of bills strongly suggests that it does not embrace a single subject
for constitutional purposes.
Indeed, this lack of relationship between the subparts of SB 2 is confirmed,
not only by the above analysis of its various subparts, but also by the very process
through which it obtained enactment. The bills which were packaged into SB 2
were not part of a coordinated legislative objective to achieve an integrated
educational goal. As noted throughout this brief, and as alleged with particularity
11

See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 148 P. 1104, 1109 (Utah 1915)
(consolidation of laws which "have been enforced for a generation or more[ ]");
Marioneaux v. Cutler, 91 P. 355, 359 (1907) (treatment of mileage allowances and
salary issues for state judges in one bill is "border-line," but passes muster under
single-subject challenge because these items have been linked historically by
statutes and constitution). See also, Ruud, "'No Law Shall Embrace More Than
One Subject,'" 42 MINN. L. REV. 389, 408 (1958) (past or settled legislative
practice; "[t]he fact that the matters have always been dealt with separately in the
past does suggest that the reason for their being combined for the first time in one
bill is log-rolling[ ]").
23

See, e.g., Catalano, "The Single Subject Rule: A Check on Anti-Majoritarian
Logrolling," 3 EMERGING ISSUS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77, 78
(1990) (legislation which involves more than one state entity is suspect under
single subject rules).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

in plaintiffs' complaint, all 14 of the bills which comprise SB 2 were introduced,
reviewed, debated, and voted upon, in committee hearings and on the floors of the
House and Senate, as unconnected, even disjointed, separate, single subjects for all
but the last two days of the session. These procedural choices demonstrate that, in
the legislature's well-considered judgment, these bills most appropriately should
have been treated apart rather than together. With respect, plaintiffs believe that
this Court should defer to that judgment, rather than the last minute, hasty, and
contrived decision which resulted in omnibus legislation, legislation which was
created for no apparent reason other than to revive 4 of the bills which previously
had failed.
The legislative judgment which treated the subparts of SB 2 as single
subjects has been seconded by the Utah State Board of Education ("USBE" or
"Board"). As alleged in the complaint, the USBE unanimously has voted its
opposition to SB 2 because of that bill's omnibus character, asking Governor
Huntsman to exercise his line-item veto power as a remedial tool in this regard.
The USBE has the constitutional authority, long-term experience, and technical
expertise to know whether there is any natural or necessary relationship between
the parts and the whole of SB 2. The Board's considered opinion, expressed
unanimously by vote and forcibly in a communication to the governor, is that there
is none. This opinion underscores the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint -
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namely, that, on a facial analysis, the subparts of SB 2 entail disparate subjects and
not a single unit for constitutional purposes.24
Taking together the lack of internal relationship among the 14 subparts of
SB 2, the legislative judgment that these subparts more appropriately should have
been treated as single subjects, and the USBE's expert opinion which echoes this
legislative judgment, the conclusion is overwhelming that this legislation is
unconstitutional under Article VI, Section 22. At a minimum, plaintiffs' complaint
which alleges or implies all of the above surely states a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
XL SUMMARY OF CLEAR TITLE ARGUMENT
Article VI, Section 22, requires, not only that bills embrace no more than
one subject, but also that this subject clearly be expressed in the title of the
proposed legislation. Utah's cases hold that, in order to satisfy this constitutional
requirement, a bill's title must give fair notice to legislators and the public of what
might be included in the legislation, and that it may not be "misleading" or
As this Court undoubtedly is aware, the USBE is the constitutionally established
branch of government charged with the "general supervision and control" of the
public education system. Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 3, provides that,
"The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be
vested in a State Board of Education." The "public education system" is defined
in Utah Constitution, Article X, Section 2, to include "all public elementary and
secondary schools and such other schools and programs as the Legislature may
designate." "[Gjeneral control and supervision," as used in Article X, Section 3,
has been interpreted to mean "the direction and management of all aspects of [the]
operation or business [of public education]." Utah School Boards v. State Bd. of
Educ, 17 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Utah 2001) (emphasis in original). This, indeed, is
"plenary" power. Id. at 1130, quoting In re Woodward, 384 P.2d 110, 112 (Utah
1963). This interpretation of Article X, Section 3, recently was restated in
University of Utah v. Shurtlejf, 144 P.3d 1109, 1120 (Utah 2006).
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productive of "surprise.'

SB 2's official title, "Minimum School Program

Budget Amendments," does not give fair notice and is positively misleading
because it is under-inclusive in relation to the contents of the bill, and because it
suggests that the legislation is a funding amendment rather than the hodge-podge
of programs that it truly was.
Although Utah's opinions consistently have held that titles, when
misleadingly under-inclusive in relation to the content of bills, offend Article VI,
Section 22, no case, to plaintiffs' knowledge, ever has determined conclusively
whether this offense may be commuted by our legislature's current practice of
giving bills two titles, one of which is the official, short, under-inclusive label, and
the other of which gives a synoptic, longer description. Plaintiffs believe that a
second title will not save the first from constitutional infirmity. The language of
Article VI, Section 22, language which may not be changed by a majority vote of
the state legislature, is "title," not "titles." And, in this case, the combination of
titles compounded rather than reduced confusion respecting the contents of SB 2.

Justice Latimer, writing in Thomas v. Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 197 P.2d
477, 508 (Utah 1948), provides a typical summation of factors: "The general rule
has been announced that the title [of a bill] is sufficient if it is not productive of
surprise and fraud and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, but
is of such character as fairly to apprise the legislators and the public of the subject
matter of the legislation and to put anyone having an interest in the subject on
inquiry."
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A. SB 2fS TITLE, 'MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM
BUDGET AMENDMENTS," IS UNDER-INCLUSIVE
IN RELATION TO THE CONTENTS OF THE BILL,
AND, THEREFORE, VIOLATES THE CLEAR TITLE
REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that SB 2's title, "Minimum School Program
Budget Amendments," is under-inclusive in relation to the contents of the bill,
and, therefore, runs afoul of the clear title requirement of Article VI, Section 22.
Plaintiffs submit that, in view of the cases discussed below, this allegation is
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for purposes of Rule
12(b)(6).

-.f

Ritchie v. Richards, 47 P. 670 (1896), was the first opinion to interpret the
clear title requirement of Article VI, Section 22. The bill in Ritchie was titled,
"An act related to and making sundry provisions concerning elections." The title's
language, "related to" and "sundry provisions," seems comprehensive insofar as
elections are concerned. But the Court held that, while a "provision for the
election of a person to fill [a] vacancy" was included in the title, a "provision for
appointing an incumbent in the meantime" was not. In other words, "[t]he general
purpose described in the title includes the election, but does not include the
appointment." Id. at 674. The bill's title, therefore, was under-inclusive in
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relation to the subject matter of the legislation. That portion of the legislation,
rye.

namely, the part dealing with appointments, was declared unconstitutional.
Ritchie's holding and rationale, that a bill title which is under-inclusive in
relation to the contents of legislation has a tendency to mislead both legislators
and the public, consistently has been followed in Utah and reflects the clear title
jurisprudence of other jurisdictions as well.27 The complaint in this case alleges

The Utah Supreme Court's second to last opinion dealing with Article VI,
Section 22, Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77, 80 (Utah 1978), reaffirmed Ritchie's
holding on the so-called enrolled bill doctrine, not only "because of veneration for
its age and its authority as established law . . . [but also] for what we regard as its
sound reasoning and salutary declaration of policy."
27

See, e.g., Pass v. Kanell, 100 P.2d 972, 974-975 (Utah 1940) (bill's title
mentions vehicle registration, but omits mention of liability for negligence in the
use of uninsured rental vehicles, a subject treated in bill proper; title, therefore, is
under-inclusive in relation to content of bill, and bill, accordingly, is
unconstitutional under Article VI, Section [22]); Carter v. State Tax Commission,
96 P.2d 727, 733-734 (Utah 1939) (bill's title references regulatory, but not
revenue raising, purpose of act, and, thus, if act had revenue raising purpose, the
title would be under-inclusive and, hence, in violation of Article VI, Section 22)
(dictum); Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645, 650-653
(Utah 1935) (title was under-inclusive, indicating the establishment of a system for
liquor control, but omitting reference to bill contents dealing with power to borrow
against state land board and power to lend of state industrial commission; in these
instances, where the act is broader than the title, "' . . . it may happen that one part
of it can stand because indicated by the title, while as to the object not indicated by
the title it must fail[ ] ' " [citation omitted]) (may be dictum); Saville v. Corless, 151
P. 51, 51-52 (Utah 1915) (bill's title says, "An act to regulate the working hours of
all employes of mercantile establishment^]" content of bill fixes hours during
which stores may remain open; content, therefore, is not clearly expressed in title
and law is unconstitutional under Article VI, Section 22); State v. Yelle, 342 P.2d
588, 592 (Wash. 1959) (state budget bill with title, "An act Adopting the
supplemental budget and making appropriations for miscellaneous purposes, and
declaring an emergency," which also included general legislation violates
constitutional provision providing that, "No bill shall embrace more than one
subject, and that shall be expressed in the title[ ]"). See generally, Dragich, "State
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that SB 2's title is under-inclusive and, therefore, states a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).
B. SB 2 S TITLE, "MINIMUM SCHOOL BUDGET
AMENDMENTS/'IS MISLEADING AND
CALCULATED TO SURPRISE, AND, THEREFORE,
RUNS AFOUL OF THE CLEAR TITLE
REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that SB 2's title, "Minimum School Program
Budget Amendments," is misleading or calculated to surprise - all in derogation of
the clear title requirement of Article VI, Section 22 -- for at least 4 reasons: (1) As
noted above, the title is under-inclusive in relation to the actual contents of the
entire legislation. (2) The minimum school budget is a term of art in respect of
funding for education in the state of Utah. SB 2's title, therefore, suggests that the

Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of
Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges," 38 HARV. J. LEG.
103, 116-117 and 146-151 (2001).
Ritchie's venerability as precedent, being decided the year our state's constitution
was ratified, has been noted. See, e.g., Dean v. Rampton, 538 P.2d 169, 174 (Utah
1975) (Henriod, J., dissenting) (enrolled bill issue: "The Ritchie case has stood
the test of time for over 80 years, enjoys the reputation of never having been
criticised or questioned, and consequently rates very highly as an authority on that
about which we are talking[ ]").
The cases involving under-inclusive titles are distinct from opinions such as Utah
State Fair Ass}n v. Green, 249 P. 1016 (Utah 1926). Green treats the opposite
problem under the title jurisprudence of Article VI, Section 22, namely, whether a
broad, comprehensive, even over-inclusive title may be used to satisfy the
constitutional requirement.
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bill treats fiscal matters only. In fact, of course, the bill contains general
legislation effecting changes in substantive law. (3) The reference to "budget
amendments" implies that the bill is amendatory only. In fact, however, the bill
contains original enactments and entirely new programs. (4) The title does not
alert readers to the fact that SB 2, which started as a boxcar measure for fiscal
legislation had become a legislative freight train, holding 13 new and additional
bills which formerly were stand-alone proposals, and that included within these 13
bills were 4 bills which previously had failed of passage on the floor of the House
and in committees in the House and Senate. Two circumstances exacerbated this
latter omission. The metamorphosis of 14 single subject, stand alone bills including the defeated and disapproved measures - into the amalgamation which
was SB 2 occurred in the eleventh hour of the legislative session. At any trial of
this matter, moreover, the evidence will show that, at least one of the proposals
which failed in the House, under legislative rules, could not have been revived for
reconsideration and inclusion in SB 2 or any other bill, and this circumstance
underscores, not only the misleading nature of the truncated title, but also the
element of stealth, skullduggery, and surprise by which that proposal was
included, through the back-door, in the final enactment. Plaintiffs submit that, in
view of the case law respecting clear title provisos, these allegations are sufficient
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
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C. SB 2fS SECONDARY TITLE DOES NOT SAVE THE
OFFICIAL TITLE FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY
Defendants are hard-pressed to deny that SB 2's title, "Minimum School
Budget Amendments," is under-inclusive and misleading for all of the reasons
alleged in the complaint. So they argue, instead, that the bill, by legislative rule, is
given 2 titles, a long one in addition to the short one, and that, when read together,
these titles are fairly descriptive of the entire contents of the legislation as passed.
They even asserted, in the lower court ~ without citing any authority for the point
- that all of the Utah cases have looked to the second or longer of the two titles in
determining whether the constitutional requirement of Article VI, Section 22, has
been met.
This argument fails, however, for at least 3 reasons. First, Article VI,
Section 22, requires that the subject-matter of the proposed legislation be clearly
expressed in a title, singular, not titles, plural. Defendants' argument does not
account for the language of the constitution, language which cannot be altered by
legislative practice, whether that practice is expressed in a rule or otherwise. Nor
does defendants' argument account for the wisdom of the singular tense in the
constitutional language. Where two titles, as opposed to one, may be considered,
the opportunities for confusion or surprise, the very evils that the constitutional
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requirement is intended to prevent, are compounded - especially where, as in our
case, discrepancies may appear between the two titles.
Second, plaintiffs respectfully dispute the assertion that Utah's cases rely
upon the second, long title in conducting analyses for purposes of constitutional
sufficiency under Article VI, Section 22. Plaintiffs have read all of these cases
and there is nothing in them to indicate that a long title as opposed to a shorter
label was used to conduct the analysis. In fact, two Utah cases strongly imply that
the use of a second title may be constitutionally improper.29
Third, according to the cases, the intended beneficiaries of Article VI,
Section 22's clear title requirement are the public at large and legislators in

For an example of this two-titled potential for confusion, where the parties are
unsure which title should be read three times as constitutionally required under
Article VI, Section 22, see, Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77, 80-81 (Utah 1978).
29

The facts of State v. Edwards, 95 P. 367, 369 (Utah 1908), suggest that the bill
under consideration in that case had two titles, a short one and a longer synopsis.
The Court stated that the second title could not be considered for purposes of
analysis under Article VI, Section 22: "This [second title] was wholly
unnecessary and the elimination of this surplus matter is not only justified, but is
required of us in order to preserve what we conceive to be a law constitutionally
framed and passed." The Edwards decision, more often referenced as Edler v.
Edwards, has been cited by this Court frequently and favorably through the years
in connection with its Article VI, Section 22, jurisprudence.
In Marioneux v. Cutler, 91 P. 355, 359 (Utah 1907), the Court seems to forbid
second titles which, through a statement of intention or clarification, seek to avoid
the constitutional proscription of Article VI, Section 22: "In conclusion, in order
to avoid a misconception of the scope of this decision we remark that the
Legislature may not disregard the constitutional provision requiring that no act
shall contain 'more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title/
by simply making the legislative intention clear in the act itself."
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particular.

The public, however, which will be less sophisticated in government

affairs and potentially unfamiliar with the legislative process, easily may be
mislead by confusions engendered under defendants' two title rule. Indeed, that
probably did occur on the facts as alleged in our complaint. Even watchful
members of the general public, those aware of the 4 non-budgetary bills which
previously had failed, would not be looking for the revival and inclusion of those
measures, by last minute legislative prestidigitation, in a bill entitled "Minimum
School Program Budget Amendments." Their eyes, distracted by the appearance
of a fiscal amendment in the official title, would have stopped there and not
looked further to discover substantive measures - let alone such measures which
had been defeated earlier in the session.
Indeed, as noted by the Court in Jensen v. Matheson, 583 P.2d 77, 80-81
(Utah 1978), "It hardly requires stating that there is a salutary purpose in the
constitutional mandate of Section 22 . . . that the subject of each act shall be
'clearly expressed in its title.' This is so the legislators [and public] will be

The clear title requirement has two beneficiaries, legislators and members of the
public. As to the latter, the purpose of this constitutional mandate is "'fairly [to]
apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that
they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they
shall so desiref ] ' " [citation omitted]). Baker v. Department of Registration, 3 P.3d
1082, 1090 (Utah 1931).
Hence, the clear title requirement, with its fair notice element, buttresses an
important policy in the state of Utah, namely, that "[c]itizen participation in
legislative proceedings is absolutely vital to ensure a fully-informed and
representative legislature." Riddle v. Perryy 40 P.3d 1128, 1132 (Utah 2002).
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advised of the subject and purpose of the act in order that there be no
misunderstanding, omitting, nor burying or obscuring of what is being proposed.
It is for that same purpose and that the act will receive proper attention and
consideration that the act is required to be read by title three times. If this
procedure of reading by title has any useful purpose whatever, it should mean
something more than designation by a mere identifying label. A fair and practical
compliance with that mandate would mean by some title sufficiently descriptive to
state the subject matter and generally how the act affects it." (Emphasis in
original and supplied.)
X. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' complaint adequately alleges the elements of log-rolling pursuant
to the single subject case law pertinent to Article VI, Section 22. Count one of the
complaint, therefore, states a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule
12(b)(6). The complaint sufficiently alleges the elements of an unclear title
violation under Article VI, Section 22. Count two of the complaint, therefore,
states a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). The lower
court's ruling to the contrary, resulting in a judgment dismissing counts one and
two of the complaint, should be reversed. This case thereafter should be remanded
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to the lower court for further pretrial proceedings and a trial on the merits of
plaintiffs' claims.
Dated this 29th day of July, 2011.

^

Alan L. Smith
1169 East 4020 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Telephone: (801)262-0555
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

48

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Opening
Brief, together with a disk containing a pdf formatted electronic version of the
same, was served this 29th day of July, 2011, by mailing copies of the same, first
class mail, postage prepaid, addressed to counsel for defendants/appellees, Jerrold
S. Jensen, Assistant Attorney General, and Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney
General, 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140857, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0857.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Tom Gregory, Glen E. Brown,
A. Lamont Tyler, Marjorie Tuckett,
Teresa Theurer, Jordan Tanner,
Debbie Swenson, Carmen Snow,
Marilyn Shields, Pat Rusk,
Ronda Rose, Jack Redd,
Georgia Peterson, Carole Peterson,
Bonnie Palmer, Denis Morrill,
Bill Moore, Sarah Meier,
Rosalind McGee. Scott McCoy,
Sheryl Allen, Dee Burningham,
Kim Burningham, Carolyn White,
Michael Jensen, Steven O. Laing,
Judy Larson, Lisa Watts Baskin,
David Hogue, Rebecca Chavez-Houck,
Janice Fisher, Christine Johnson,
Beth Beck, Mike Marsh,
Karen Hale, Becky Edwards,
Janet Cannon, and Steven C. Baugh,

COMPLAINT

civil No. DSMo $8 i4
Plaintiffs,

Judge:

3>ev/er

vs.
Mark Shurtleff, in his official
capacity as Attorney General
for the state of Utah, Edward
Alter, in his official capacity
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Deputy Clark

as Treasurer for the state
of Utah, and Jeff Herring, in
his official capacity as Executive
Director of the Utah Department
of Human Resource Management,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs bring this action against defendants, seeking a judgment declaring that
SB 2 (second substitute), a bill passed in the 2008 General Session of the Utah State
Legislature, is unconstitutional in light of the requirements of Article VI, Section 22, and
Article X, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution, as well as an injunction, blocking the
i

implementation, funding, and enforcement of this legislation. For causes of action,
plaintiffs show this Honorable Court as follows.
THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
i

1. Plaintiffs are a non-partisan coalition of citizen voters who believe that their
elected representatives in the Utah State Legislature are the people's servants. Plaintiffs,
moreover, are united by their concern that these representatives should conduct the
people's business in an orderly, open, and ethical manner, consistent with those
fundamental, mandatory, procedural constraints set forth in the Utah Constitution.
2. Plaintiffs are committed to the following elementary propositions. Good laws
(

are a product of good lawmaking. Good lawmaking, at a minimum, is a process which
insures — through its transparency and fairness - the participation of all citizens. Citizen
participation, not only is a fundamental right, guaranteed by the Utah Constitution, but
also is a procedural imperative if enacted laws are to reflect, through the mirror of
representation, the will of the people. Concerned citizens cannot know how to direct their
participation when legislative proposals are falsely named or otherwise disguised through
2
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omnibus "Christmas Tree" bills and hydra-headed substitutions in the last hours of a
legislative session. In this fashion, moreover, lawmakers grow deaf to the people's voice,
and the will of the many may be denied or defeated through the parliamentary
maneuverings of a few.
3. Each plaintiff is an individual, residing in the state of Utah. Each is a
registered voter, taxpayer, and citizen of Utah. Plaintiffs include members of both major
political parties, Republican and Democrat. Their government service and (where
appropriate) political affiliations are as follows.
4. Tom Gregory presently serves as a member of the Utah State Board of
Education ("USBE"). The USBE is established pursuant to Article X, Section 3, of the
Utah Constitution. Article X, Section 3, likewise provides that "[t]he general control and
supervision of the public education system shall be vested" in the USBE. All members of
the USBE are elected in non-partisan races to serve 4 year terms.
5. Glen E. Brown, a Republican, formerly served as Speaker of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
6. A. Lamont Tyler formerly served as a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
7. Marjorie Tuckett currently is a member of the Board of Directors of the Utah
School Boards Association ("USB A"). Founded in 1932, the USB A is an umbrella
organization which represents all 40 school districts in the state of Utah. Ms. Tuckett
serves in a non-partisan capacity with the USBA.
8. Teresa Theurer currently is a member of the USBE. This is a non-partisan
office.
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9. Jordan Tanner formerly served as a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
10. Debbie Swenson currently serves as a member of the Board of Directors of
the USB A. Ms, Swenson serves in a non-partisan capacity with the USB A.
11. Carmen Snow formerly served as President of the Utah Chapter of the Parent
Teacher Association ("PTA").
12. Marilyn Shields formerly served as a member of the USBE. As noted above,
all USBE members are non-partisan.
13. Pat Rusk currently serves as the Executive Director of Utahns for Public
Schools ("UTPS"), a non-partisan coalition of organizations seeking reform and
improvements for public schools in the state of Utah. Ms. Rusk formerly has served as
President of the Utah Education Association ("UEA").
14. Ronda Rose has served on the Utah State PTA Board for over 10 years, and
she has served on local and regional PTA Boards since 1995.
15. Jack Redd formerly served as a Republican member and majority leader of the
House of Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
16. Georgia Peterson formerly served as a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature. Ms. Peterson also has served as a
Commissioner on the Utah State Tax Commission.
17. Carole Peterson formerly served as Chief Clerk of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
18. Bonnie Palmer formerly served (in a non-partisan capacity) as President of the
USBA. She presently serves as Chairperson of the Executive Committee of UTPS.
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19. Denis Morrill presently serves as a member of the USBE. As noted above, all
service on the USBE is non-partisan in nature.
20. Bill Moore presently serves as a member of the Board of Directors of the
USBA and as a member of the Davis County School Board. He formerly served as
President of the USBA. All service on the USBA and local school boards is non-partisan
in nature.
21. Sarah Meier presently serves as President of the Granite School Board and as
a member of the Board of Directors of the USBA. She formerly served as President of
the USBA. Her service on the USBA and with the Granite School Board is non-partisan
in nature.
22. Rosalind McGee presently serves as a Democratic member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
23. Scott McCoy presently serves as a Democratic member of the Senate in the
Utah State Legislature.
24. Sheryl Allen presently serves as a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
25. Dee Burningham is registered to vote as a Republican. He formerly served as
the political director of the UEA.
26. Kim Burningham presently serves as a member of the USBE. He formerly
served as Chairperson of the USBE. All such service, as noted above, is non-partisan in
character. Prior to such service, he was a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
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27. Carolyn White currently is a non-partisan member of the Board of Directors
oftheUSBA.
28. Michael Jensen presently serves (in a non-partisan capacity) as a member of
the USBE.
29. Steven O. Laing formerly served as the State Superintendent of Public
Instruction for the state of Utah. Pursuant to the provisions of Article X, Section 3, of the
Utah Consitution, the USBE appoints the state superintendent who then becomes "the
executive officer of the board." As an appointee of the USBE, the state superintendency
is non-partisan in nature.
30. Judy Larson formerly served (in a non-partisan capacity) as a member of the
USBE.
31. Lisa Watts Baskin presently serves as a Councilperson on the City Council for
North Salt Lake. She formerly has served as an attorney in the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel.
32. David Hogue formerly served as a Republican member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
33. Rebecca Chavez-Houck presently serves as a Democratic member of the
House of Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
34. Janice Fisher presently serves as a Democratic member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
35. Christine Johnson presently serves as a Democratic member of the House of
Representatives in the Utah State Legislature.
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36. Beth Beck is a retired school administrator and a former President of the
UEA.
36a. Mike Marsh presently serves (in a non-partisan capacity) as a member of the
Board of Directors of the USBA.
37. Karen Hale formerly served as a Democratic member of the Senate in the
Utah State Legislature.
38. Becky Edwards is a long-time community advocate for education and family
health issues.
39. Janet Cannon presently serves in a non-partisan capacity as a member of the
USBE.
40. Steven C. Baugh formerly served as Superintendent of the Alpine School
District. He is an associate professor of educational leadership at the university level in
the state of Utah.
41. As noted above, all plaintiffs are concerned with the openness, fairness, and
integrity of the process by which the Utah State Legislature enacts legislation and the
extent to which that process, if constitutionally impaired, impacts their ability, as
representatives, senators, education officials, or constituents, to affect that process. All
aver that their ability to have input in and impact upon the various bills which became SB
2 (second substitute) in fact was impaired, if not thwarted, in view of the process which
the Utah State Legislature followed in enacting that particular legislation.
42. Plaintiffs who are elected or appointed as legislators or officials have taken an
oath under Article IV, Section 10, of the Utah Constitution. This oath requires them,
among other things, to "support, obey and defend . . . the Constitution of this State," and
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to "discharge the duties of my office with fidelity." These plaintiffs feel bound by their
oath to bring the instant action.
43. Defendants are the Utah state officials primarily charged with funding,
implementing, administering, and enforcing the provisions of SB 2 (second substitute).
Each defendant is sued in his official capacity for the purpose of obtaining declaratory
and injunctive relief.
44. Pursuant to the provisions of title 78 of the Utah Code, this Court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this civil action. Based upon the claims
which are set forth below, and pursuant to Utah Code, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., as well
as Rule 57, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment declaring
that SB 2 (second substitute) (or a portion thereof) is unconstitutional, invalid,
ineffective, and unenforceable. Based upon the claims which are set forth below, and
pursuant to Rule 65, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction
(preliminarily and/or permanently) which restrains defendants from enforcing,
implementing, or administering (through the disbursement of funds or otherwise) the
provisions of SB 2 (second substitute) (or a portion thereof).
45. Pursuant to the provisions of title 78 of the Utah Code and Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant in this
civil action.
46. Pursuant to the provisions of title 78 of the Utah Code, the venue for this civil
action properly is laid in this Court.
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BACKGROUND AVERMENTS
47. On March 5,2008, the last day of the 2008 General Session, the Utah State
Legislature enacted SB 2 (second substitute) (hereinafter called "SB 2" or the "Omnibus
BiHn).
48. Although SB 2 was titled simply "Minimum School Program Budget
Amendments," the bill was an omnibus measure which cobbled together no fewer than 14
separate pieces of legislation, relatively few of which dealt with the "Minimum School
Program Budget" referenced in the title.
49. The legislative measures which became SB 2 had been introduced as no fewer
than 14 separate bills with single subjects during the course of the 2008 General Session,
demonstrating a legislative judgment that each of these 14 bills should be reviewed,
debated, and voted upon according to their individual merits independently of any other
item of legislation or legislative agenda.
50. Further demonstrating this legislative judgment, all but one of these 14 bills in
fact were reviewed, debated, and voted upon according to their individual merits prior to
their amalgamation into the Omnibus Bill. In this regard, and subject to further
discovery, plaintiffs tentatively have reconstructed the legislative record which, to the
best of their understanding at present, shows the following.
Fourteen Bills Introduced and Considered as Single Subjects
51. HB 67 - Extended Year for Special Educators, Lines 865 to 911 of SB 2
initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 67 on January 21, 2008. When
introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Extended Year for Special Educators."
A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 11 to 0 on January 25,
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2008. The bill passed the House by a vote of 62 to 0 on January 30, 2008, after which it
was forwarded to the Senate. A Senate committee reported favorably on the bill by a
vote of 4 to 0 on February 7,2008. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 22 to 0 on
February 14, 2008. Even though the bill had passed both houses, however, it was not
forwarded to the governor for his signature. Instead, and apparently in contravention of
the Rules of the Fifty-Seventh Legislature (updated as of January 2,2008), it was held in
abeyance and ultimately rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
52. HB 200 - Early Childhood Learning and Evaluation. Lines 259 to 399 of
SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 200 on February 28,2008.
When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Early Childhood Learning and
Evaluation." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 10 to 2 on
February 18, 2008. But after being replaced with HB 200 (first substitute) on the House
floor, it was disapproved by the entire House by a vote of 31 to 37 on February 29,2008.
Although the Rules of the Fifty-Seventh Legislature (updated as of January 2, 2008)
required that motions for reconsideration be made and heard, if at all, within 24 hours of
a bill's defeat on the House floor, there was no motion for reconsideration of the negative
vote on HB 200. This bill achieved passage only because it ultimately was rolled into
and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
53. HB 212 - State System of Public Education Amendments or Educator
Salary Adjustments. Lines 718 to 772 of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single
subject as HB 212 [which became HB 212 (second substitute)] on February 12, 2008.
When proposed as a single subject, the bill was titled "State System of Public Education
Amendments." A substitute bill, also proposed as a single subject, was titled "Educator
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Salary Adjustments." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 15
to 0 on February 15, 2008. The bill passed the House by a vote of 66 to 0 on February
22,2008, after which it was sent to the Senate and held in abeyance until ultimately
rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
54, HB 266 - Accelerated Learning Program Revisions. Lines 534 to 602 and
622 to 624 of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 266 on January 21,
2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Accelerated Learning
Program Revisions." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 11
to 1 on January 30, 2008. The House passed the bill by a vote of 72 to 0 on February 8,
2008, after which it was sent to the Senate. But the bill stalled in the Senate, failing of
recommendation on account of a tied committee vote. The bill ultimately was rolled into
and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
55. HB 270 - Utah Science Technology and Research Initiative Centers,
Lines 912 to 965 of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 270 on
January 21, 2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Utah Science
Technology and Research Initiative Centers." A House committee reported favorably on
the bill by a vote of 10 to 0 on January 25,2008. The House passed the bill by a vote of
73 to 0 on January 31,2008, after which it was forwarded to the Senate. A Senate
committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 3 to 0 on February 6,2008. The
Senate passed the bill by a vote of 22 to 1 on February 14, 2008. Nevertheless, the bill
was not forwarded to the governor for his signature. Instead, and apparently in
contravention of the Rules of the Fifty-Seventh Legislature (updated as of January 2,
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2008), the bill was held in abeyance and ultimately rolled into and enacted as part of the
Omnibus Bill.
56. HB 278 - Charter School Funding Amendments. Lines 95 to 258 and 603
to 621 of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 278 on January 28,
2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Charter School Funding
Amendments." Although reported favorably by a House committee vote of 8 to 1 on
February 18,2008, the bill failed of passage in the House by a vote of 33 to 41 on
February 25,2008. A motion for reconsideration of HB 278 as a single subject may have
been entertained as allowed pursuant to the legislative rules. Nevertheless, the bill
ultimately was rolled into and obtained enactment as part of the Omnibus Bill.
57. HB 329 - High-ability Student Initiative Program. Lines 966 to 1005 of
SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 329 on January 25, 2008. When
introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "High-ability Student Initiative
Program." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 11 to 1 on
February 18,2008. The bill passed the House by a vote of 64 to 0 on February 25, 2008,
and was sent to the Senate. It was held in the Senate and ultimately rolled into and
enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
58. HB 363 - Public Education-Arts Enhanced Learning Program or
Beverley Taylor Sorenson Elementary Arts Learning Program. Lines 1029 to 1060
of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as SB 363 [which later became SB
363 (first substitute)] on February 1,2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill
was titled "Public Education - Arts Enhanced Learning Program." A substitute bill, also
submitted as a single subject, was titled the "Beverley Taylor Sorenson Elementary Arts
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Learning Program." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote of 10 to
0 on February 13,2008. The bill passed the House by a vote of 71 to 0 on February 21,
2008, and was sent to the Senate where it was held and ultimately rolled into and enacted
as part of the Omnibus Bill.
59. HB 419 - Public Textbook Evaluation Amendments. Lines 468 to 491 of
SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 419 on February 12,2008.
When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Public School Textbook
Evaluation Amendments." A House committee reported favorably on the bill by a vote
of 9 to 0 on February 25, 2008. The bill ultimately was rolled into and enacted as part of
the Omnibus Bill.
60. HB 436 - English Language Learner Family Literacy Centers Program.
Lines 1006 to 1028 of SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as HB 436
February 6,2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "English
Language Learner Family Literacy Centers Program." A House committee reported
favorably on the bill by a vote of 10 to 0 on February 22,2008. The House passed the
bill by a vote of 55 to 9 on February 27,2008. The bill thereafter was forwarded to the
Senate and ultimately rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
61. SB 35 - Differentiated Pay for Teachers* Lines 773 to 864 of SB 2 initially
were introduced as a single subject as SB 35 [which later became SB 35 (second
substitute)] on January 21,2008. When introduced as a single subject, this bill and its
substitute were titled "Differentiated Pay for Teachers." It was reported favorably out of
a Senate Committee by a vote of 5 to 1 on January 22,2008. It passed the Senate by a
vote of 19 to 7 on February 5,2008. It then was forwarded to the House where it may
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have died on a tie vote in Committee February 27,2008. In any event, SB 35 ultimately
was rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
62. SB 61 - Financial and Economic Literacy Education. Lines 400 to 467 of
SB 2 initially were introduced as a single subject as SB 61 on January 21, 2008. When
introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Financial and Economic Literacy
Education." It was reported favorably out of committee by a vote of 7 to 0 on January
28, 2008. It was passed by the Senate by a vote of 24 to 0 on February 2,2008. It then
was forwarded for consideration by the House. It was reported favorably out of
committee in the House by a vote of 11 to 0 on February 18, 2008. The bill thereafter
was held in abeyance until rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
63. SB 118 - Education Transportation Amendments. Lines 635 to 717 of SB
2 initially were introduced as a single subject as SB 118 on January 21,2008. When
introduced as a single subject, this bill was titled "Education Transportation
Amendments." It was reported favorably out of committee by a vote of 5 to 0 on January
24,2008. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 26 to 0 on February 5, 2008. It was
sent to the House February 5, 2008. It was reported favorably out of committee by a vote
of 12 to 0 on February 18, 2008. The bill thereafter was held in abeyance for a month
until it was rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus Bill.
64. Sections 12,13, and Uncodified Sections of SB 2. Plaintiffs are unsure of
the origins of lines 492 to 533 and 603 to 621 and 1072 to 1155 of SB 2. Plaintiffs are
certain, however, that these are appropriations measures or measures related to
appropriations. This is the money that was intended, among other purposes, to fund the
so-called Minimum School Program looking to the future. These portions of SB 2

14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sometimes hereafter, for convenience of reference, will be called the "money bill" or
words to that effect. This money bill, in effect, was held in abeyance and not distributed
for consideration until March 4,2008, one day prior to the end of the legislative session.
After distribution, it passed both houses of the legislature as part of the Omnibus Bill.
65. Plaintiffs aver that, since each of the bills noted above was introduced as a
single subject, and since each was reviewed, debated, and considered by either or both
houses of the state legislature as a single subject, this course of dealing establishes a
legislative judgment that each bill in fact was a single subject which should have been
considered individually on its own merits and not in combination with other bills.
The Hostage Bills
66. Several of the bills referenced above were enormously popular as independent
measures. Indeed, passage of these bills, in view of the perceived need for reform efforts
in public education, was considered by many to be a legislative imperative. Included in
this category were bills such as HB 67, HB 212, HB 270, SB 118, and, of course, the
money bill.
67. As expected, several of these bills passed both houses of the state legislature
as single subjects. These approvals occurred unanimously or by overwhelming
majorities. These included HB 67 and HB 270, both of which had cleared both houses no
later than February 14, which was 19 calendar days and 14 legislative days before the
session ended.
68. Still other bills passed at least one house and had received committee approval
for passage in another house. These approvals occurred unanimously or by
overwhelming majorities. These included SB 61 which passed the Senate February 2 and
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obtained committee approval in the House February 18, and SB 118 which passed the
Senate February 5 and received committee approval in the House February 18, which was
16 calendar days and 12 legislative days before the session ended.
68a. The relatively early dates of passage by one or both houses for bills such as
HB 67, HB 270, SB 61, and SB 118 suggest a deliberate intent by a small group of
insider legislators to interrupt the normal flow of bill consideration with respect to these
measures for the express purpose of holding them hostage.
69. And still another set of bills passed at least one house by unanimous vote or
overwhelming majority and then was held in abeyance until ultimately becoming part of
the Omnibus Bill. These included HB 212 which passed the House February 15, HB 329
which passed the House February 25, and HB 436 which passed the House February 27.
As with the bills noted above in the immediately preceding paragraph of this complaint,
the relatively early passage of HB 212 in particular reinforces the impression of hostage
holding by an insider group.
70. Finally, the money bill, although contemplated for passage early in the
session, was not distributed for consideration until March 4, when it promptly became the
linchpin and centerfold for the Omnibus Measure which was enacted as SB 2.
71. Plaintiffs aver that these popular bills were used as hostages to obtain passage
of less popular or unpopular bills, bills that, but for the hostage bills, did not or could not
have obtained passage if considered alone and on the basis of their individual merits. As
noted above, these so-called hostage bills, although they had passed (or could quickly
have been passed) by both houses of the state legislature, deliberately were not forwarded
to the governor for signature or otherwise were held in abeyance so that they could serve
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as hostages in order to extort enactment of the less popular or unpopular bills referenced
below. On information and belief, plaintiffs aver that the bills described above as hostage
bills deliberately were held back so that they could be used as hostages to extort or
compel enactment of the less popular bills described below.
The Price for Release of the Hostages
72. As indicated above, other bills were less popular or decidedly unpopular.
These included HB 278 which was voted down (33-41) in the House February 29, HB
200 which was defeated (31-37) in the House February 29, and HB 266 which, although
passing in the House, could not get out of committee in the Senate. These also may have
included SB 35 which, although passing the Senate on February 5, may have died in a
House committee on February 27. None of these bills could obtain passage by the
constitutionally required majorities of both houses of the state legislature when viewed
independently on their own merits. All achieved passage only because they were
combined with the popular bills that were rolled into and enacted as part of the Omnibus
Bill.
Unclear Title Problems
73. SB 2, as noted above, is titled "Minimum School Program Budget
Amendments." This title is misleading for the following reasons which are meant to be
illustrative and not exhaustive.
74. SB 2 is an Omnibus Bill, containing at least 14 separate bills, only a portion of
which treats the so-called Minimum School Program. SB 2's title falsely implies that SB
2 treats only the Minimum School Program and not other subjects.
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75. SB 2's title falsely implies that the bill is confined to budgetary questions
whereas many of the bills which are incorporated into SB 2 treat substantive, statutory
policy issues, as distinct from fiscal issues.
76. SB 2's title falsely implies that it is amendatory in nature, amending existing
statutes, whereas many of the bills which are incorporated into SB 2 enact entirely new
legislation which in turn establish brand new programs.
77. SB 2's title misleadingly fails to inform legislators and the public that certain
bills which had failed of passage in either the House or the Senate during the course of
the session have been rolled into this Omnibus Measure.
78. Some of the titles by which the individual bills comprising SB 2 were
introduced and tracked through the course of the session were confusingly altered when
these bills were rolled into and considered as part of SB 2. For example, SB 35 was
known as the "Differential Pay for Teachers" bill throughout the session, but became the
"Teacher Salary Supplement Program,'1 an entirely different name with a distinctive
meaning, when enacted as lines 774 to 864 of SB 2.
COUNT ONE: THE OMNIBUS BILL VIOLATES
THE SINGLE SUBJECT REQUIREMENT
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22,
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
79. In light of the facts set forth above and below, the Omnibus Bill violates the
single subject requirement of Article VI, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution, which
provides, in pertinent part, that, "Except general appropriations bills and bills for the
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codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."
80. Article VI, Section 22, is a mandatory limitation on legislative power, and, in
particular, the process by which the legislature exercises power in the consideration and
enactment of legislation.
81. By passing the Omnibus Bill, the legislature violated Article VI, Section 22,
in at least 3 distinct respects. A violation in even one of these respects, standing alone,
however, would be sufficient to warrant a judgment that the Omnibus Bill is
unconstitutional pursuant to Article VI, Section 22.
The First Respect in Which the Omnibus Bill
Violates the Single Subject Requirement of Article VI, Section 22.
82. What is a "single subject" for purposes of Article VI, Section 22? Whether
the Omnibus Bill treats a single subject or multiple subjects is to be determined in light of
the purpose which the framers intended to be served when they passed Article VI,
Section 22. That purpose is to prevent parliamentary maneuverings whereby any bill, so
unpopular that it could not pass on its own merits when standing alone, is bundled with
popular measures in order to extort enactment of the unpopular measure. When this
occurs, the single subject rule of Article VI, Section 22, is offended.
83. The averments in this complaint amply demonstrate that this occurred through
the passage of the Omnibus Bill. In particular, and without limiting the foregoing,
plaintiffs point the Court to statements made by a member of the legislature in the wake
of SB 21s passage. Michael Waddoups, the Republican Senator from District 6, issued a
written statement to all delegates at the Salt Lake County Republican Convention on or
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about May 10, 2008. The statement reads, in pertinent part, "This funding bill [SB 2]
was presented to the legislature the day before the session ended leaving no time to
debate the bill and rewrite a new one. It was put together by House and Senate
Leadership. This is not the way funding is traditionally handled. I thought it was wrong
then and I still think it was wrong. However, I, along with almost every other legislator,
voted for it because we were faced with the problem that school funding was included in
this bill. Had we not voted for the bill education would have remained unfunded. Many
of the senators were upset about it and we are currently in the process of seeing it never
happens again."
84. Demonstrating the same point in a different way, at the most recent meeting of
the Interim Education Committee, on or about May 21,2008, the wisdom (and the
constitutionality) of a portion of SB 2, namely, the International Baccalaureate Program,
was challenged. Stephen Urquhart, the Republican representative from St. George,
approved the carving out of the IB portion of SB 2 for constitutional review by the
committee staff, stating that, "I think with an ongoing appropriation, it's fully appropriate
to see if we want to continue to make that appropriation on a bill that failed to make it
through the process[.]" (Emphasis supplied.)
The Second Respect in Which the Omnibus Bill
Violates the Single Subject Requirement of Article VI, Section 22.
85. What is a "single subject" for purposes of Article VI, Section 22? When any
bill combines appropriations measures with general legislation, this is a perse violation
of the "single subject" requirement of Article VI, Section 22. This is because, consistent
with the first respect in which the Omnibus Bill violates the single subject requirement,
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money bills, which are critical for government funding, and which usually are subject to
passage in the last hours of a legislative session, too easily are taken hostage for the
purpose of extorting passage of otherwise unpopular measures. The averments in this
complaint, especially Senator Waddoups's statement in this regard, amply demonstrate
that this occurred through the passage of the Omnibus Bill.
The Third Respect in Which the Omnibus Bill
Violates the Single Subject Requirement of Article VI, Section 22.
86. What is a "single subject" for purposes of Article VI, Section 22? Under the
single subject rule, bills may combine measures which are related historically,
instrumentally, or necessarily by subject-matter. But to say that SB 2 contains only a
single subject because all of its provisions, in some way, however disjointedly, relate to
matters of "education," in the end, proves too much. We could just as well say that all
legislation is related to the business of "government," thereby easily circumventing the
constitutional proscription of Article VI, Section 22. The "single subject" principle of
Article VI, Section 22, must be applied meaningfully so that legislative abuses do not
become the exceptions which swallow the rule.
87. In this regard, the Omnibus Bill did not treat a single, related subject area for
the following reasons which are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.
88. Deference to the legislative judgment that SB 2 is an Omnibus Bill in
violation of Article VI, Section 22, Courts should not second-guess lightly the manner
in which a legislature desires to conduct business. But what was the overwhelming
weight of legislative judgment in this regard? Members of the Fifty-Seventh Legislature
during the 2008 General Session, every man and woman in both House and Senate,
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treated these 14 bills as separate measures, introducing, reviewing, debating, and voting
on each according to its individual merits for 43 days of a 45 day session. This course of
dealing establishes a well-nigh irrefutable presumption that, in this case, each of these 14
bills in fact was a single subject which should have been considered separately on its own
merits and not in combination with other bills in SB 2, the Omnibus Bill Only in the last
hours of that session were the bills bundled into SB 2, and the vote on this Omnibus Bill,
i

as Senator Waddoups indicated above and as plaintiff legislators will testify at the trial of
this matter, was not a judgment about what constitutes a single subject for constitutional
purposes, but rather a matter of expedience, if not exigency, to free the hostage bills and
educational funding for the coming budgetary cycle.
89. Deference to the USBE judgment that SB 2 is an Omnibus Bill in
violation of Article VI, Section 22. The USBE, as noted above, is the constitutionally
established agency empowered with "general control and supervision of the public
education system" for the state of Utah. After SB 2 was enacted and sent to Governor
Huntsman, the USBE, by unanimous vote, sent the Governor a letter urging him to veto
I

the Omnibus Bill. This correspondence argues, in effect, that SB 2, although nominally
an "education" measure, contains disparate, unrelated subject matters within the
education code and, thus, is an omnibus bill in violation of Article VI, Section 22.
Hence, the constitutional entity with the greatest expertise in educational policy in the
state of Utah views SB 2 as containing multiple rather than single subject matters within
the meaning of Article VI, Section 22. This Article X determination, like the legislative
judgment noted above, is entitled to considerable deference by the judicial branch in
adjudicating the constitutionality of the Omnibus Bill

22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

90. SB 2 in fact contains multiple, disparate subject matters in contravention
of the constraints of Article VI, Section 22. One yardstick for determining whether a
particular bill contains multiple or single subjects is the codification of various subjects in
the education code. Different subjects related to public education are treated and codified
in separate chapters of that code. Hence, for example, the single subject of USBE
governance is treated separately in one chapter and not intermingled with the different
subject of core curricula which is partitioned in another chapter. SB 2 clearly offends the
single subject rule when measured against the codification yardstick in the following
particulars which are meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive and which are not
listed by order of importance.
91. SB 2 does an end-run around the education code, as well as Article X, Section
3, of the Utah Constitution, by having a non-education related department, the
Department of Human Resource Management, administer questions respecting educator
salaries.
92. SB 2 establishes a State governed, pre-school, home-school program for lowincome families. Fee waivers for low-income students historically have been handled in
local districts. Pre-schooling is outside the conventional mandate of Utah's
constitutionally prescribed education system. Home-schooling, speaking conceptually, is
treated as an exemption from the conventional requirements of that public education
system. And, indeed, the UPSTART portion of the Omnibus Bill is codified in that
separate chapter of the education code which treats alternatives to public education.
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93. Portions of the Omnibus Bill treat textbooks and instructional materials.
These subjects historically have been dealt with in a separate chapter of the education
code.
94. Portions of the Omnibus Bill create an English Language Learner Family
Literacy Center Program to be administered by local school boards. The jurisdiction of
local school boards over various programs is a matter of separate codification in chapter 3
i

of the education code. SB 2, however, rolls this particular measure into the Minimum
School Program Act which is codified in chapter 17 of the education code.
95. Portions of the Omnibus Bill treat the so-called Minimum School Program.
The Minimum School Program is a term of art which separately is codified in the
education code. The nature and scope of the Minimum School Program have been
defined statutorily in chapter 17 of the education code. They also have been defined as a
(
matter of historical legislative practice. SB 2 inserts several new, optional programs,
such as the High Ability Student Initiative Program, into the middle of the Minimum
School Program, in contravention of these statutory prescriptions and this historical
practice.
96. In view of all of the foregoing considerations, plaintiffs aver that the Omnibus
Bill is unconstitutional pursuant to the single subject requirement of Article VI, Section
22, of the Utah Constitution.
97. In the alternative, those portions of the Omnibus Bill which clearly offend the
single subject requirement (which portions, subject to final proof, may include HB 200,

.

HB 266, HB 278, and SB 35) should be severed from SB 2 for the purpose of making a
constitutional adjudication of the legislation in this case.
(
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i

98. The Omnibus Bill (or a severed portion of SB 2) should be declared
unconstitutional as violative of the single subject requirement of Article VI, Section 22,
of the Utah Constitution.
99. Because the Omnibus Bill (or a severed portion of SB 2) is unconstitutional,
defendants should be enjoined from enforcing, administering, implementing, or funding
the relevant provisions of this legislation.
COUNT TWO: THE OMNIBUS BILL VIOLATES
THE CLEAR TITLE REQUIREMENT
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22,
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
100. In light of the facts set forth above, the Omnibus Bill violates the clear title
requirement of Article VI, Section 22, of the Utah Constitution.
101. In the alternative, those portions of the Omnibus Bill which plainly offend
the clear title requirement (which may include, subject to proof, HB 200, HB 266, HB
278, and SB 35) should be severed from SB 2.
102. The Omnibus Bill (or a severed portion of SB 2) should be declared
unconstitutional as violative of the clear title requirement of Article VI, Section 22, of the
Utah Constitution.
103. Because the Omnibus Bill (or a severed portion of SB 2) is unconstitutional,
defendants should be enjoined from enforcing, administering, implementing, or funding
the relevant provisions of this legislation.

25
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

COUNT THREE: PORTIONS OF SB 2
VIOLATE THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
AND ARTICLE X, SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
104. As noted above, SB 2 incorporates and enacts SB 35. SB 35 is found at lines
774 to 864 of SB 2. When introduced as a single subject, SB 35 was titled
"Differentiated Pay for Teachers." When rolled into and enacted as part of SB 2, this
legislation was re-named the "Teacher Salary Supplement Program."
105. SB 35 or lines 774 to 864 of SB 2 creates a program to supplement the
salaries of eligible teachers under specified criteria.
106. Although nominally an "education program," SB 35 or lines 774 to 864 of
SB 2 delegates administration of the new legislation to the Utah Department of Human
Resource Management, and not to the Utah State Board of Education.
107. Article X, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution requires that education-related
programs shall be administered by the Utah State Board of Education. This power of
supervision and control is complete and exclusive.
108. SB 35 or lines 774 to 865 of SB 2 are unconstitutional in that they have
delegated power to administer an educational program to the Utah Department of Human
Resource Management, rather than to the Utah State Board of Education, all in violation
of Article X, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution.
109. This Court should declare that SB 35 or lines 774 to 865 of SB 2 are an
unconstitutional delegation of power in violation of Article X, Section 3, of the Utah
Constitution.
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110. This Court should enjoin the Utah Department of Human Resource
Management from implementing or otherwise administering any aspect of SB 35 or lines
774 to 865 of SB 2.
COUNT FOUR: PORTIONS OF SB 2
VIOLATE THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
AND ARTICLE X, SECTION 3, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
111. Section 11 of SB 2 requires an "independent party" (via private contract) to
evaluate and map the alignment of public school instructional materials to the so-called
core curriculum. These provisions of SB 2, moreover, forbid the Utah State Board of
Education and other governmental entities from performing or supervising this work of
evaluation and alignment.
112. Article X, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution requires that education-related
programs shall be administered by the Utah State Board of Education. This power of
supervision and control is complete and exclusive.
113. Section 11 of SB 2 is unconstitutional in that it delegates the power to
administer an educational program to private, so-called "independent parties," while at
the same time stripping the Utah State Board of Education of any supervisory control
respecting such delegation, all in violation of Article X, Section 3, of the Utah
Constitution.
114. This Court should declare that Section 11 of SB 2 is an unconstitutional
delegation of power in violation of Article X, Section 3, of the Utah Constitution,
115. This Court should enjoin defendants from implementing or otherwise
administering any aspect of Section 11 of SB 2.
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, having asserted the causes of action set forth above, plaintiffs ask the
Court to enter an order in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants which order shall
provide for the following relief
a. A declaration of unconstitutionality (with or without severability) as set forth
above.
b. An injunction (preliminary and/or permanent), prohibiting defendants or any of
them from funding, implementing, administering, or enforcing any provisions of SB 2
which this Court has declared to be unconstitutional on any ground.
c. Attorneys fees and costs of court.
d. Such additional relief as the Court may deem equitable or appropriate under all
of the facts and circumstances of this civil action.
Dated this 28th day of May, 2008.

Alan L. Smith (Utah Bar No. 2988)
Attorney and Counselor at Law
1492 East Kensington Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801)521-3321
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TOM GREGORY, etal.,
RULING
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 080908814

MARK SHURTLEFF, etal.,.

Judge: L A DEVER

Defendants.
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs' Complaint and Plaintiffs* Motion to Strike Evidentiary
Matters. Having reviewed the Parties* Motions and Oppositions thereto, and, having
heard oral arguments on the matter on March 26, 2009, the Court makes the following
Ruling.
Background
Plaintiffs include various members of the Utah State Board of Education, Utah
School Boards Association, Parent Teacher Association, Utah Education Association,
former and current members of the State Legislature, and related groups. Plaintiffs
seek a judgment from this Court declaring Senate Bill 2 \ a bill passed in the 2008

1

The bill is entitled the Minimum School Program Budget Amendments. The bill:
(1)
establishes the value of the weighted pupil unit at $2,577;
(2)
establishes a ceiling for the state contribution to the maintenance and operations portion
of the Minimum School Program for fiscal year 20.08-09 of $2,495,183,979;
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General Session as unconstitutional pursuant to Article VI, Section 222 and Article X,

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)
(10)
(11)

modifies provisions related to the funding of charter schools;
authorizes the use of appropriations for accelerated learning programs for International
Baccalaureate programs;
modifies the positions that qualify for educator salary adjustments and increases the
salary adjustments for those positions;
establishes and funds the following ongoing programs:
(a)
a pilot project using a home-based educational technology program to develop
school readiness skills of preschool children;
(b) . a financial and economic literacy passport to track student mastery of-certain
concepts;
(c)
the Teacher Salary Supplement Program to provide a salary supplement to an
eligible teacher; for special educators for additional days of work;
(d)
an optional grant program to provide an extended year for math and science
. teachers through the creation of Utah Science Technology and Research
Centers;
.(e)
the High-ability Student Initiative Program to provide resources for educators to
enhance the academic growth of high*ability students; and
(f)
the English Language Learner Family Literacy Centers Program;
makes one-time appropriations for fiscal year 2008-09 for:
(a).
pupil transportation to and from school;
(b)
the Beverley Taylor Sorenson Elementary Arts Learning Program to provide
grants to integrate arts teaching and learning into selected schools; and
(c)
classroom supplies;
requires the State Board of Education to allocate Minimum School Program nonlapsing
balances to provide:
(a)
one-time signing bonuses for new teachers;
(b) . one-time performance-based compensation; and
(c)
a grant program to minimize the expenses of teachers to obtain the American
Board Distinguished Teacher certification and to provide additional compensation
to teachers who obtain that certification;
provides a repeal date for certain pilot programs;
makes nonlapsing appropriations; and
makes technical corrections.

2u

Every bill shall be read by title three separate times in each house except in cases where
two-thirds of the house where such bill is pending suspend this requirement. Except general appropriation
bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than
one subject, which shall be clearly expressedin its title. The vote upon the final passage of all bills shall be
by yeas and nays and entered upon the respective journals of the house in which the vote occurs. No bill
or joint resolution shall be passed except with the assent of the majority of all the members elected to
each house of the Legislature." (emphasis added).
2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Section 33 of the state constitution. (CompL, 2). The Motion before the Court relates
specifically to Article VI, Section 22. Plaintiffs further seek an injunction blocking the
implementation, funding, and enforcement of the legislation, id.
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint because they are concerned with the openness,
fairness, and integrity of the process by which the State Legislature enacts legislation
and the extent to which that process, If constitutionally impaired, impacts their ability,
as representatives, senators, education officials, or constituents, to effect that process/'
id. at 7. Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action: (1) The Omnibus Bill Violates
the Single Subject Requirement of Article V!, Section 22; (2) The Omnibus Bill Violates
the Clear Titfe Requirement of Article VI, Section 22; (3) Portions of SB 2 Violate the
Non-Delegation Doctrine and Article X, Section 3; and (4) Portions of SB 2 Violate the
Non-Delegation Doctrine and Article X, Section3yMat18-27.
Senate Bill Two's title references the Minimum School Program Act. The initial
purpose of the Minimum School Program Act provided that the Act:
Relates to public education. Provides for state and local funding of
the minimum school program. Establishes the value of the weighted pupil
unit. Requires school districts to impose a minimum basic tax rate.
Provides for funding of school reform programs. Establishes distribution

A-

"The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State
Boareaof Education, The membership of the board shall be established and elected as provided by statute.^The State Board of Education shall appoint a State Superintendent of Public instruction who shall be the
executive officer of the board."

3
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formulas. Provides for a contingency fund. Provides an appropriation for
the school building supported program.
1991 Bill Tracking UT S.B. 196; see Utah Code Ann. § 53A-17a-102 (1991)4. The
language of Section 53A~17a-102, addressing the purpose of the Minimum School
Program Act, has not changed since 1991

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 1 AND 2
Defendants explain that during the 2008 General Session, legislative leadership
combined thirteen school funding bills receiving the highest prioritization by legislators
with the school finance bill. (Defs/ Mem. In Supp.,'2). Aside from the bill's short title, it
has a long title found on lines eight through ninety-one of the enrolled bill. JdHighlighted provisions of the long title include the sum proposed to be appropriated by
the bill along with a description of the thirteen separately introduced bills, id.; see Ex. A.
Defendants maintain that courts give wide latitude to the legislature as to what
4

Provides "(1) The purpose of this chapter is to provide a minimum school program for the state
in accordance with the constitutional mandate. It recognizes that ail children of the state are entitled to
reasonably equal educational opportunities regardless of their place of residence in the state and of the
economic situation of their respective school districts or other agencies.
(2) It further recognizes that although the establishment of an educational system is primarily a
state function, school districts should be required to participate on a partnership basis in the payment, of a
reasonable portion of the cost of a minimum program.
(3) It is also the purpose of this chapter to describe the manner in which the state and the school
districts shall pay their respective share of the costs of a minimum program. This chapter also recognizes
that each locality should be empowered to provide educational facilities and opportunities beyond the
minimum program and accordingly provide a method whereby that latitude of action is permitted and
encouraged" (emphasis added).

4
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constitutes a single subject and clear title. Id. at 3. The Utah Supreme Court explained:
Upon the question of titles to amendatory acts the cases are very
numerous, but not always in strict harmony. The courts are, however,
unanimous with respect to the following genera! rules to be observed: (1)
That the constitutional provision now under consideration should be
liberally construed] (2) that the provision should be applied so as not to
hamper the lawmaking power in framing and adopting comprehensive
measures covering a whole subject, the branches of which may be
numerous, but where all have some direct connection with or relation to
the principal subject treated; (3) that the constitutional provision should be
so applied as to guard against the real evil which it was intended to meet;
(4) that no hard and fast rule can be formulated which is applicable to all
cases, but each must to a very large extent be determined in accordance
with the peculiar circumstances and conditions thereof, and that the
decisions of the courts are valuable merely as illustrations or guides in
applying these general rules. Moreover, it is now established beyond
question that unless the invalidity of a particular law in question is clearly
and manifestly established the law must prevail as against such an
objection. If, therefore, by any reasonable construction, the title of the act
can be made to conform to the constitutional requirement, it is the duty of
the courts to adopt this construction rather than another (if the title be
open to more than one construction) which will defeat the act. (1 Lewis1
Suth. Stat. Const [2d Ed.], sees. 115-127, and cases there cited.) In case
of doubt it must be assumed that the Legislature understood and applied
the title so as to comply with the constitutional provision, and not contrary
thereto. If, after applying such a reasonable construction the title is
insufficient, or the subject is plural, then the law must fail. The provision is
mandatory, and may not be ignored.
State exfel. Edte'r v. Edwards. 95 P. 367, 368 (Utah 1908) {emphasis added).
The court further explained that the purpose of Article VI, Section 22, was to
prevent the Legislature from Intermingling in one act two or more separate and distinct
propositions-things which, in a legal sense, have no connection with, or proper relation

5
>
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to, each other." Martineau v. Crabbe. 150 P. 301, 304 (Utah 1915)(emphasis added), it
stated, This requirement of singleness is not intended to embarrass honest legislation,
but only to prevent the vicious practice of joining in one act incongruous and unrelated
matters; and if ail the parts of a statute have a natural connection and reasonably relate,
directly or indirectly to one general and legitimate subject of legislation, the act is not
open to the objection of plurality, no matter how extensively or minutely it deals with the
details looking to the accomplishment of the main legislative purpose/' Jd- (quotation
omitted); see also State v. TwitchelL 333 P,2d 1075,1078 (Utah 1959) (holding that the
title does not have to be an index to the act and, all that is required is that the subject
matter of the act be reasonably related to the title and that all parts of the act be
reasonably related to each other); State v, Kallas, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939) (explaining
that even though the original Liquor Control Act of 1935 Section 195 dealt with penalties
and the amending section made no change to the penalty, the section did not violate the
constitutional proscription because anything germane to the general subject expressed
in the title of the original law, or that could have been included in the original law under
its general title, could be included in a subsequent amendatory act); Globe Grain &
Milling Co. v. Industrial Comrn'n. 91 P.2d 512, 516 (Utah 1939) (explaining that the
constitutional provision does not require that all the methods prescribed in the act for
.*K**-

* •»

carrying out its objects be reflected in the title, nor all the classes affected by the act).

6
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PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION
Plaintiffs assert that Senate Bii! 2 ("SB 2") violates the single subject rule by
bundling substantive law with budgetary amendments and appropriations measures.
Plaintiffs maintain that SB 2 is the product of "log-roiling." They further maintain that the
omnibus parts bear no relationship to each other because they are so disparate in
subject matter, purpose and effect. Plaintiffs allege that agencies having nothing to do
with education are identified in the omnibus bills. However, Plaintiffs' assertions reflect
an incomplete representation.
For example, Plaintiffs claim that SB 2 provides for implementation and
administration by agencies that have nothing to do with educational affairs, like the Utah
Department of Human Resources. (Pis/ Opp., 10). This specific example falls under
Section 53A-17a-156, Teacher Salary Supplement Program. (Def/s Mem. In Supp. Ex.
A, S.B. 2, 2008 Leg., Gen. Sess., Ins. 771-850 (Utah 2008)). It should be noted that the
aforementioned section is part of the Minimum School Program Act, which is the short
title of SB 2 i.e. Minimum School Program Budgets Amendment. The relevant section
of the statute provides:
(4) The Department of Human Resource Management shall:
(a).create an on-line application system for a teacher to apply to
receive a salary supplement through the Teacher Salary
Supplement Program;
7
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(b) determine if a teacher:
(i) is an eligible teacher; and
(ii) has a course assignment as listed in Subsections
(1)(a)(i)(A) through (D);
(c) verify, as needed, the determinations made under Subsection
(4}(b) with school district and school administrators; and
(d) certify a list of eligible teachers and the amount of their salary
supplement, sorted by school district and charter school, to the
Division of Finance.
(5) (a) An eligible teacher shall apply with the Department of Human
Resource Management prior to the conclusion of a school year to receive
the salary supplement authorized in this section.
Utah Code Ann, § 53A~17a-156 (2008). It is reasonable to consider that this provision
is consistent with the purpose of Minimum School Program Act Section 53A-17a-102(3),
which provides in relevant part, "This chapter also recognizes that each locality should
be empowered to provide educational facilities and opportunities beyond the minimum
program and accordingly provide a method whereby that latitude of action is permitted
and encouraged;" See also supra n.4.

As the Utah Supreme Court explained

regarding Article VI, Section 22, "This requirement of singleness is not intended to
embarrass honest legislation, but only to prevent the vicious practice of joining in one
act incongruous and unrelated matters[.f

Martineau, 150 P. at 304 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Under Utah's liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaipttff is required to submit a
"short and plain statement... showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a
8
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demand for judgment for the relief." Code v. Utah Deol of Health, 2007 UT App 390,
% 4, 74 P.3d 1134, (internal citation omitted) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2)). The
Utah Court of Appeals explained, "It is important to also note that the fundamental
purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the
requirement that their adversary have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of
the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Zoumadakis v,
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr.. 2005 UT App 325, If 3,122 P.3d 891 (quotation omitted). A
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying
merits of a particular case. Tuttle v. Olds. 2007 UT App 10, 1f 14,155 P.3d 893 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[l]f there is
any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the
issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof."
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194.199 (Utah 1991)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the United States District Court for the District of Utah explained:
in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all
well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from conctusory
allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to
. . . the nonmovag party, [internal footnote omitted]. Plaintiff must provide
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
[internal footnote omitted]
But, the court "need not accept conciusory
9
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allegations without supporting factual averments" [internal footnote
omitted]. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh
potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess
whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim
for which relief may be granted." [internal footnote omitted].
TecServe v. Stoneware, inc.. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58929 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2008)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiffs do not present any factual allegations. Plaintiffs provide a history of the
2008 legislative session as it relates to SB2. (Compl. 9-18). While these are facts, they
are insufficient to state a claim for relief. Plaintiffs provide no context for the Court to
consider its factual review of the legislative session or its assertion of "the hostage bills."
Plaintiffs statements are conclusory.

*»

Their causes of action: (1) The Omnibus Bill Violates the Single Subject
Requirement of Article VI, Section 22, and, (2) The Omnibus Bill Violates the Clear Title
Requirement of Article VI, Section 22, are based on conclusory allegations, not facts.
Plaintiffs are seeking a legal determination from this Court as to whether SB 2 complies
with Article VI, Section 22 of the state constitution. "[A] plaintiff must 'nudge[ ][his}
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible' in order to survive a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some
set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the
court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual

10
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support for these claims/' Id. (quotation omitted).
Conclusion
Based upon case law as discussed above, see supra pp. 4-6, and, Plaintiffs'
failure to make anything other than conclusory aliegations without support of factual
averments, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 and II of
Plaintiffs' Complaint.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
The Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike Evidentiary Matters submitted by the
Defendants in support of the Motion toiDismiss, The Plaintiffs correctly point out that
evidentiary submissions are inappropriate under Rule 12(b)(6). The Court orders the
evidentiary matters submitted by the Defendants to be stricken.

This Ruling serves as the ORDER OF THE COURT. No further order is
required.
Dated 19m day of May, 2009.

BY THE COURT •'-.•; \

LADEVER\^C\
-\/
DISTRICT COURT!JUQ"GE
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TecServe v. Stoneware, Inc., 2 08-CV-144 (UTDC)
TECSERVE, a Utah corporation dba Stoneware Partners and L. James Ellsworth, Plaintiffs,
v.
STONEWARE, INC., an Indiana Corp., Defendant.
No. 2:08-CV-144TS
United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division
August 4, 2008
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS OR
TRANSFER FOR IMPROPER VENUE AND TRANSFERRING CASE
TED STEWART United States District Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
These matters are before the court on Defendant Stoneware's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to
Transfer Venue on the basis that Plaintiff TecServe's claims were improperly filed in Utah rather than Indiana, and that
Plaintiff Ellsworth's claim fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted.'1' The Court finds that TecServ's major
claims and Plaintiff Ellsworth's sole claim are governed by a forum selection clause requiring they be brought in state or
federal court in Indiana. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion and transfers this case to the District of Indiana.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff TecServ, Inc. is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff
L. James Ellsworth (Ellsworth) is TecServe's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah.
Defendant is Stoneware Inc. (Stoneware) an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indianapolis,
Indiana.
Stoneware is in the business of developing software. In 2007, TecServ entered into negotiations with
Stoneware to acquire an ownership interest in its company. On June 21, 2007, TecServ and Stoneware entered into a
non-binding letter of intent (LOI) outlining TecServ's proposal to purchase some or all of the capital stock of Stoneware.
Among the terms of the LOI was one prohibiting Stoneware from hiring any new employees for a certain period of time.' 2 '
The parties' negotiations broke down and the parties ended their negotiations on August 27, 2007, by signing
a Termination Agreement and Release (Termination Agreement). The Termination Agreement's "effective date" was
August 27, 2007. [3 l The Termination Agreement contains an integration clause rendering it "the entire agreement of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

parties concerning its subject mater."M On behalf of TecServ, Ellsworth conducted the negotiations leading to the
Termination Agreement and signed the Termination Agreement as TecServ's CEO.
In addition, the Termination Agreement provides as follows:
2. Release by TecServ. TecServ hereby irrevocably and unconditionally releases and forever discharges
Stoneware and its directors, shareholders, officers, representatives, employees, agents and assigns from
any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, actions and causes of action (collectively,
"Claims"), relating to the LOI and with respect to all periods on or before the Effective Date (whether or
not such Claims are known or unknown, choate or inchoate).
3. Complete Defense. TecServ hereby (a) acknowledges and agrees that this Agreement shall be a
complete defense to any Claim released under paragraph 2 above; (b) agrees not to pursue any Claim
released under paragraph 2 above against Stoneware or any other persons released under paragraph 2
above; and (c) consents to entry of a temporary or permanent injunction to prevent or end the assertion
of any such Claim.
8. Applicable Law; Venue. This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of the state of Indiana, without regard to such jurisdiction's conflict of laws principles. Any action or
proceeding seeking to enforce any provision of, or based on any right arising out of, this Agreement shall
be brought against any of the parties in the courts of the State of Indiana, Marion County, or if it has or
can acquire jurisdiction, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
(Indianapolis Division), and each of the parties consents to the jurisdiction of such courts (and of the
appropriate appellate courts) in any such action or proceeding and waives any objection to venue laid
therein.

,

In September of 2007, TecServ asserted the existence of an extra-contractual oral agreement between it and
Stoneware that would allow TecServ to purchase Stoneware's stock. Tecserv alleges Ellsworth negotiated and entered
into the alleged oral agreement on TecServ's behalf on August 16, 2007,^ shortly before the parties entered into the
Termination Agreement.
i

On September 17, 2007, Stoneware filed a declaratory judgment lawsuit in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana in accordance with the forum-selection clause in the Termination Agreement (the Indiana
Case). In the Indiana Case, Stoneware asserts its rights under the release and integration clauses of the Termination
Agreement J 6 ' and also seeks to recover against TecServ on invoices for software and related services.'7^ Stoneware did
not serve TecServ in the Indiana Case within 120 days as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).' 8 ' On February 4, 2008, the
Indiana court issued an Order to Show Cause why Stoneware's Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to serve

<

TecServ. On February 21, 2008, TecServ moved to dismiss Stoneware's Indiana Complaint under Rule 4(m),t9' the Order
to Show Cause was discharged,t10' and Stoneware filed its response in opposition to the motion to dismiss the Indiana
case. That motion is pending in the Indiana Court.
On January 30, 2008, TecServ filed the current action in the Third Judicial District Court, for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. On February 21, 2008, Stoneware removed this action to this Court.
In the present action, TecServ brings the following claims against Stoneware: breach of contract; breach of
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; specific performance; misappropriation, breach of fiduciary duty,
determination of rights, and account in connection with an alleged partnership/joint venture; conversion based on
misappropriation of accounts receivable; conversion of other property; misappropriation of trade secrets; unjust
enrichment, and fraud in the inducement of the Termination Agreement. In addition, Plaintiff Ellsworth brings one claim
for declaratory judgment against Stoneware.'11' Ellsworth's claim is based on the allegation that Stoneware and
TecServe entered an oral agreement whereby Stoneware agreed to convey 10% of its stock to TecServe, "and/or its
shareholders" and also gave TecServe "and/or its shareholders" an opportunity to acquire up to 25% more stock.'12'
Stoneware moves to dismiss TecServ's claims against it for two reasons: first, for improper venue based upon
the venue selection clause; second, because Stoneware contends that the claims against it were compulsory
counterclaims in the Indiana Action. Stoneware also moves to dismiss Ellsworth's claim against it for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
II. STANDARD
A party may move a court to dismiss an action based on "improper venue."'13' In the alternative, a court may
also transfer the matter to a more appropriate venue, if it be in the interest of justice.'14' "A motion to dismiss based on a
forum selection clause frequently is analyzed as a motion to dismiss for improper venue under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3)."'15'
Rule 12(b)(3) states that a party may move to dismiss the action for "improper venue."'16' If venue is improper, the court
may either dismiss or, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to the proper court where venue is appropriate.
[17]

Stoneware also moves to dismiss Ellsworth's claim for the failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
(6). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from
conclusory allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to TecServ as the nonmoving party.
' 18 ' Plaintiff must provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."'19' All well-pleaded factual
allegations in the amended complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
'2°1 But, the court "need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments."'21' "The court's function
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether
the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted."'22'
However, the Supreme Court recently prescribed a new inquiry for us to use in reviewing a dismissal:
whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." The
Court explained that a plaintiff must "nudgef ][his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" in
order to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus, the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could
prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court
reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these
claims.'23^
III. DISCUSSION
TecServ does not dispute the validity of the venue provision; the issue is only whether it covers TecServ's
claims against Stoneware. Stoneware contends that under the forum selection clause, or venue provision,'24' the only
proper venue is Indiana. Stoneware contends that TecServ's claims fall under the forum selection clause, and would
therefore require these claims to be adjudicated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
(Indianapolis Division).
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Parties are free to contract into venue selections clauses, if they so choose.t25' Such clauses are "prima facie
valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the
circumstances."'26] "Before [a] Court can make a determination regarding whether such a forum selection clause is valid
or enforceable, it must first determine which agreement or agreements apply to this action as between the parties at
bar."!27!
The Termination Agreement provides that it shall be construed and governed under Indiana law. Accordingly,
the Court applies Indiana law to this motion to dismiss for improper venue based on the Termination Agreement's venue
provision.' 28 '
Applying Indiana law, in the case Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., [29'the Indiana Court of Appeals adopted
the Seventh Circuit's position that tort and statutory claims arising out of a contract are subject to that contract's forum
selection clause:
As for the fact that the defendants are charged with fraud rather than breach of contract, this can get the
plaintiff nowhere in its efforts to get out from under the forum-selection clause. Not only does the clause
refer to disputes concerning the contractual relationship between the parties, however those disputes are
characterized. More important, a dispute over a contract does not cease to be such merely because
instead of charging breach of contract the plaintiff charges a fraudulent breach, or fraudulent inducement,
or fraudulent enforcement. The reason is not that contract remedies always supersede fraud remedies in
a case that arises out of a contract; sometimes they do, sometimes they don't. It is that the existence of
multiple remedies for wrongs arising out of a contractual relationship does not obliterate the contractual
setting, does not make the dispute any less one arising under or out of or concerning the contract, and
does not point to a better forum for adjudicating the parties' dispute than the one they had selected to
resolve their contractual disputes.
We completely agree with this analysis. Accordingly, [plaintiffs] tort and statutory claims that arise out of
the Consulting Agreement are subject to the forum selection clause and must be litigated in California.^
Accordingly, the Court rejects TecServ's argument that its claims are outside the forum selection clause
because TecServe has cast its claims as "non-contractual tort or statutory claims."'31^ Instead, the Court examines
whether the claims are within the scope of the forum selection clause, no matter how those claims are characterized in
artful pleading.
TecServ contends that the venue provision does not apply because it is not "seeking to enforce any provision
of the Termination Agreement and its claims are not "based on any right arising out of the Termination Agreement.
Instead, TecServ agues it is seeking to enforce a separate oral agreement.
Stoneware contends that the venue provision covers any claim based on any right arising out of the
Termination Agreement, including the release of all claims "related to" the LOI, "and with respect to all periods on or
before" the August 27, 2007 effective date.
Because the Complaint alleges that the oral agreement was concluded on August 16, 2007—a date before
the effective date of the Termination Agreement—any claim based on the alleged oral agreement constitutes a claim with
respect to the period before the Termination Agreement's effective date. Further, TecServ's fraud in the inducement claim
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alleges the purpose of the alleged false statements was to induce the signing of the Termination Agreement and
thereby allow the hiring of certain employees.'32' This hiring was expressly prohibited by the LOI but expressly allowed
under the Termination Agreement.'33] Similarly, TecServ alleges that a significant part of its consideration for the oral
agreement was its agreement to terminate the LOI and allowing the hiring of those certain employees—rights only arising
out of the Termination Agreement.'34]
The Court finds that resolution of these claims necessarily involves construing the Termination Agreement
because, by its plain language, the Agreement covers all such claims. Accordingly, the Court finds that the claims herein
alleging the existence of a separate oral agreement and alleging fraud in the inducement of the Termination Agreement
arise out of termination agreement and therefore trigger its venue selection clause.'35'
The Utah cases cited by TecServ, Sorenson v. Riffo, ' 36 'and Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Connecticut Yankee
Atomic Power Co., ' 3 7 ' are not to the contrary. Those cases apply Utah law, not Indiana law. Further, in EnergySolutions,
the Court found that it was not necessary to adjudicate the rights of the parties under the contract containing the
arbitration clause in order to resolve the claims in that case.' 38 ' Thus, because the contract was "not materially relevanfto
the resolution of the claims in EnergySolutions, that contract's forum selection clause was "not triggered"' 39 ' a very
different situation than the present case.
The Court finds that under Indiana law, Ellsworth's claims are also subject to the forum selection clause. "[C]
ourts in this country . . . enforce forum selection clauses in favor of non-parties 'closely related' to a signatory."'40' "In
order to bind a non-party to a forum selection clause, the party must be 'closely related to the dispute such that it
becomes 'foreseeable' that it will be bound.' 41 '
The Complaint alleges it was Stoneware and TecServ that made the oral agreement.'42' Under the facts as
alleged in the Complaint, Ellsworth, as a shareholder, is a third-party beneficiary of TecServe's alleged oral agreement
between TecServe and Stoneware. Such third-party beneficiaries "of a contract would, by definition, satisfy the 'closely
related' and foreseeability' requirements'" imposed by courts for binding non-signatories to a forum selection clause.' 43 '
Because the forum selection clause applies to TecServ's claims based upon the alleged oral agreement, it also binds
Ellsworth's claim, as a third-party beneficiary to the alleged agreement, for declaratory judgment on the alleged oral
agreement.
Further, even if TecServe's and Ellsworth's claims were not subject to the venue selection provision, this case
would not proceed in this district due to the first-to-file rule. Under the first-to-file rule "where two courts have concurrent
jurisdiction, generally the first court in which jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the case."' 44 ' The Court finds
none of the exceptions to the first filed rule apply to this case.' 45 ' Under the rule, the Indiana Court has priority to consider
the case and this Court would decline jurisdiction even absent the venue selection clause.
Further, the existence of the venue selection clause in this case shows the wisdom behind the first-to-file rule
because "[a] party to a forum selection clause may not raise in a different forum, even as a compulsory counterclaim, a
dispute within the scope of that clause."'46' Thus, Stoneware could not enforce the Termination Agreement's release and
defense clauses or otherwise rely on its rights arising out of the Termination Agreement as a counterclaim in this forum. It
would be barred by the forum selection clause from doing so even if those rights would otherwise be compulsory
counterclaims herein.'47'Because Stoneware may not rely on or enforce its rights under the Termination Agreement's
release clause in this venue, the compulsory counterclaim rule, and its issue preclusion effect, would not apply to those
compulsory counterclaims.'48' As noted above, Stoneware has already affirmatively asserted its rights under the
Termination Agreement in the Indiana Case.' 49 ' As a result of the venue selection clause's restrictions on Stoneware, the
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failure to apply the first-to-file rule in this case would result in duplicative proceedings and may well result in
inconsistent rulings.
Because the Court is ruling on the basis of the forum selection clause, the Court need not address
Stoneware's arguments that Ellsworth's claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) or its arguments that the claims
herein are compulsory counterclaims in the Indiana case. In view of the forum selection clause, those arguments are
more appropriately addressed to the Indiana court.
IV. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, t is therefore
ORDERED that Stoneware's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue (Docket No. 8) is
GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the hearing set for September 5, 2008, at 2:00 p.m. is VACATED. It is further
ORDERED that this case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
(Indianapolis Division).
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